RESISTING PARTICIPATION
Renegotiating Slum Upgrading Through Resistance
International Alliance of Inhabitants
November 2018
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“Government should be enablers (in slum upgrading), we felt that by enabling structure owners to invest in housing we could expand the stock of housing for the urban poor” – Interview with anonymous Kenyan government official, 2018.

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November 2018
Abstract

Slum upgrading is a policy that has been championed all throughout the global south with little hinderance. Much of the “success” behind slum upgrading is that it has been carried out in participatory manners. Contrary to what many institutions believe, academia has shown how participatory politics often serves to close debate and reduce accountability surrounding the implementation of large scale infrastructure projects. In the case of Nairobi, many of these participatory bodies are coopted by the local “elites”. As a result, many of the intended beneficiaries of slum upgrading are excluded from the project, especially the tenant category of slum dwellers. However, much of the discontent with slum upgrading is never heard beyond the confines of the local community. This report provides a preliminary look at local forms of resistance and whether or not resistance can offer a viable alternative for many of the slum-dwellers excluded from slum upgrading.

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I would like to thank the International Alliance of Inhabitants, especially Cesare Ottolini, for having given me this opportunity to apply much of the work I had done during my Masters. I would also like to thank Jean-Fabien Steck for having guided me through this process. Nonetheless, this report would not have been possible without the ceaseless help and support from Wilfred Olal. Equally, I would like to infinitely thank Kennedy Chindi, Ben Ooko and Martin Ndungu for being available to help and guide throughout the entire process. Without their dedication, advice and encouragement I would not have been able to reach the level of analysis this report has provided. Lastly, I would like to thank David Mwaniki, Humphrey Otieno, Tom Mboya, Brian Inganga, Peter Nyagesera and all the other residents of Nairobi I had the chance to interview.
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List of Acronyms:

CBO – Community-Based Organization
FBO – Faith-Based Organization
GoK – Government of Kenya
IAI – International Alliance of Inhabitants
KENSUP – Kenya National Slum Upgrading Program
KISIP – Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Project
KNHRC – Kenya National Human Rights Commission
KURA – Kenya Urban Roads Authority
KSUP – Korogocho Slum Upgrading Program
MDG – Millennium Development Goals
MoU – Memorandum of Understanding
NCC – Nairobi City County
NYS – National Youth Service
RC – Residents Committee
SDI – Slum Dwellers International
UN – United Nations
The R-Existences: lessons from the slums of Nairobi

Cesare Ottolini

The opposition to small/large projects for building infrastructure, modernization, expanding cities or densifying neighborhoods are, very often, presented by mainstream media as a refusal of progress, the desire to preserve minor privileges or sterile claims of human rights, unable to produce urban and housing policies capable of addressing the immense housing and urban problems affecting more than 1.5 billion people worldwide.

Research that digs deep to grasp the reality of resistance to evictions

This research, carried out as part of the collaboration between Sciences Politiques Paris, the Urban School, Governing the Large Metropolis and the International Alliance of Inhabitants, aimed to dig deep and understand what really happens behind the meta data, who the social and institutional protagonists on the ground are, the nature of the conflicts and what proposals they produce.

Brice Jacquemin spent several months in 2018 in Nairobi, under the supervision of Jean-Fabien Steck and with myself coordinating, looking for real answers in a specific territory, taking for granted neither the official reading nor the superficial interpretation of episodes of resistance, questioning the protagonists on both sides and comparing the answers with the scientific literature on the topic.

Starting with a specific and archetypal case, the idea was to go deeply into the roots of the arguments used by the mainstream media, supported by scientific research, demonstrating that more than half of the world’s population now lives now in cities. However, the same media makes an incomprehensible logical leap: that only the implemented policies of the New Urban Agenda are considered, expected and unchangeable. These arguments seem to consider the trend of urbanization of the entire human population as unstoppable, unavoidable, and do not question the role of cities and public-private partnerships in supporting this limitless development.

In so far as the human factor is considered by this dominant approach, inhabitants are often seen by the authorities in charge of development as a dependent variable, i.e. one

*IAI Global Coordinator, November 2018
of the pillars of neoliberal and capitalist policies founded, precisely, on the continuous reproduction of capital: in the case of a road project or a tourist settlement, the inhabitants must be moved if they are in the way, without any possibility of challenging the path of the road or the priority given to hotels or other infrastructure projects compared to pre-existing housing settlements.

In other words, the inhabitants are considered as the dried leaves, covered over by the new seasons, or referred to as illegal and therefore to be swept away, often without any warning or adequate compensation. Even when housing solutions are offered, they are almost always unsustainable economically or socially and very rarely respect human rights as defined by General Comments no. 4\(^1\), no. 7\(^2\) and no. 24\(^3\) of the ICESCR UN Committee.

There are several levels involved in achieving the goal of marginalizing and trivializing the side effects of urban development, particularly evictions.

On a scientific level, by eliminating the "evictions" indicator from the UN Slum Index, resulting in a lack of collected data and therefore no official quantification of evictions. Another step on the path to officially overlooking evictions was the dissolution of the Advisory Group on Forced Evictions by UN Habitat, which, until 2009, analyzed and offered solutions to cases, often difficult, for the different stakeholders, providing an overview.

This push to ignore reality has led to inhabitants’ resistance being presented as residual, anti-historical, or an expression of partisan and/or criminal interests. On this basis, the resistance movements are easier to isolate, and therefore easier to attack by means of the police and the courts, with bulldozers and fires.

On a more sophisticated level, responding to the apparent standards of the politically correct, resistance movements are disempowered by so-called "participatory slum upgrading", the approach adopted by UN Habitat and the World Bank to promote resilience with most NGOs operating on the ground remaining neutral, if not supportive.

\(^1\) CESCR General comment No. 4 (1991) The right to adequate housing (Art.11 (1).
https://www.escr-net.org/resources/general-comment-4

\(^2\) CESCR General comment No. 7 (1997) The right to adequate housing (Art.11.1): forced evictions.
https://www.escr-net.org/resources/general-comment-7

\(^3\) CESCR General comment No. 24 (2017) on State obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the context of business activities.
Slum-upgrading alternatives to evictions do exist

Are we sure that this is the reality and that these are the right paths to achieve the Sustainable Development Goal 11: making cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable? Or are there alternatives which, respecting human rights and with the participation of inhabitants, even that expressed through resistance, will indicate more just and effective policies in the short, medium and long term?

In 2004, the International Alliance of Inhabitants, together with the popular organizations of Nairobi, in particular the Kutoka Parish Network with the support of the Comboni Missionaries, W Nairobi W!

4, launched one of the most successful Zero Evictions Campaigns to support resistance against the evictions of around 300,000 slum inhabitants.

The stated aims of the evictions, to secure the inhabitants of areas at risk and to redefine the road structure, although understandable, were unacceptable, mainly because the practical application would have led to the eradication of entire communities and pushed the poor even further to the margins, thus creating new slums.

Thanks to incredible local and international mobilization, the battle was won and the evictions were blocked. The next stage of the campaign took on a radically innovative character because it proposed to improve the slums with the participation of the inhabitants and use of financial resources freed by the cancellation of Kenya’s sovereign debt.

The proposal was so innovative that, at the beginning, neither the Kenyan government nor the NGOs operating on the ground agreed with it. But local and international mobilization succeeded in bringing the parties to sign an historic agreement: the total cancellation of Kenya’s debt with Italy in exchange of participatory social policies, particularly the improvement of the Korogocho slum, where everything began.

The evictions have recently resumed, this time with more emphasis on building the road infrastructure that the city needs, as in the case of the Kibera-Langata road project that is literally splitting this slum, one of the most populated in the world.

So we wanted to know what had happened in the meantime. On the one hand, we wanted to lend a hand to the popular organizations that were sounding the alarm, particularly

4 https://www.habitants.org/zero_evictions_campaign/campaign_w_nairobi_w
Bunge La Mwananchi and People Settlement Network, and help define an effective strategy for resistance actions.

On the other hand, we also wanted to try and draw conclusions of a more general nature, to be included in the training and capacity-building of people’s leaders in conducting Zero Evictions Campaigns in Africa and other regions of the world.

**Some useful elements for building concrete, less evident answers: the R-Existences**

Based on these premises, together with the author of the research we defined its aims, identified the slums to be investigated (Korogocho, Huruma and Kibera) and the living sources to draw on for information, and agreed on the participatory methodology.

The author has enriched the research by including the scientific literature on the subject, providing a framework of references, including theoretical, relating to the analysis of slums and strategies of resistance in comparison to strategies of resilience.

The author spent several months traveling through various slums, meeting the protagonists of the struggles and the institutional leaders responsible for political choices, taking part in the meetings and the various activities, and enjoying a privileged point of view, internal and external at the same time, indispensable to the analysis.

He draws on this experience to propose a number of useful elements for building concrete, less evident answers.

The research has thus been able to explore, among other things, the reasons why the W Nairobi campaign’s victories have been compromised by some political choices, such as the choice of providing individual title deeds rather than collective ownership, which has undermined the social sustainability of the slum-improvement process. He shows how some choices are justified, partly by the social conditions at the outset, i.e. 80% of Korogocho inhabitants were tenants of the owners of the housing, but also because institutions and many NGOs supported resilience policies.

To trace the line leading to the present day, the research has analyzed who is driving resistance to the Kibera Langata Road project and how, as well as what point it could reach under current conditions.

The study draws a conclusion that is not straightforward, but the research effectively provides elements for analysis and reflection which need to be shared to help bring together the struggles of individual organizations, an essential spur to enhancing joint
strategies, and to present the resistance movements’ proposals as credible alternatives, capable of mobilizing and having an impact.

Instead of the "efficient dictatorship" of practiced, no-limits developmentalism, resistance should therefore be considered as a valuable tool, provided by popular organizations for real "participatory slum upgrading".

By viewing it in this way, we could try to reconcile, through alternative and appropriate policies, the top-down approach and the bottom-up mechanism.

It is now up to popular organizations to study this research carefully, to help others in their own territory to understand what is really happening, the weaknesses and the potential. In this way, the claims of resistance can be supported, including the underlying struggle of an ideal and political nature, including with the support of scientific evidence.

We can thus work on the unity and impact of resistance struggles.

We can also make it clear to decision-makers that the resistance movements should be seen as offering added value and merit priority attention in all the slum-upgrading processes, not to be crushed or rendered impotent, but to make a substantial contribution to the resolution of the systemic problems inherent in participation, defeating the lack of transparency, frustration, and unsustainability.

In other words, resistance should be recognized as an effective driving force because it is an expression of living beings, therefore promoting not only human rights and the environment but also the progress and responsibility of inhabitants as co-governors of the settlements in which they live and contribute to building.

The R-Existences: Resistance to destruction to affirm the right of people and communities to Exist.
Introduction:

Housing and land policy is widely considered as a necessary tool to bridge society’s deeper lying inequalities. The rational is that providing individuals with stable tenure or land ownership will lead to greater empowerment of the individuals targeted. It minimizes the risks the urban poor face, allowing them to focus their efforts on other “priorities”. In the “global south”, land and housing policy has often focused on the regularization of the land poorer inhabitants “illegally” occupy or squat. The hope is that such policy leads to the economic emancipation of poorer classes to fulfill their economic potential. By owning land, these members of society will have easier access to capital or can sell land for other purposes (De Soto, 2000; Galiani & Schargodsky, 2010; Mitchell, 2005). Many academics might not share this vision, yet it certainly is a program often implemented by governmental bodies and international organizations. We have learnt from history, much of the housing policy aimed at society’s “weaker” members, has not managed to fulfill its ambitions. If we look at affordable housing policies in many parts of the globe, affordability has often been an instrument to advantage the middle classes, those who lie around median income levels. In its wake, it has further contributed to the divide between the financially stable and precarious classes. In the case of land regularization, a similar story is to be told. Taking the case of land regularization in Peru, Timothy Mitchell demonstrates how the World Bank put in place a programed “natural experiment” where title deeds were implemented to benefit least impoverished settlement areas. With deeper analysis, Mitchell demonstrates how the World Bank was trying to prove its own agenda, that title deeds lead to greater economic activity amongst the urban poor, therefore promoting greater neo-liberalization of land policy. Equally, the program was designed as a way to regain government influence over certain revolutionary areas in Peru (Mitchell, 316). This essay will not look that the effects of land titling in Peru, but the brief introductory note on land and housing politics was simply to provide a backdrop on why it’s necessary to look at such policies with a great deal of skepticism. Land and housing in any setting is always a very contentious matter. As mentioned, if used appropriately, it can be an effective tool to correct inequalities. It is for this very reason that it is very difficult to force change in the way land is distribute, as there are many vested interests in the maintenance of the status quo.

Today, agencies such as the UN and the World Bank have championed a new solution regarding the issue of secure housing or land tenure. This solution is known as
participatory slum upgrading. Briefly, slum upgrading is a policy which aims at improving the housing stock in informal settlements. It achieves this by demolishing informal housing and replacing with what is known as permanent structures. Slum upgrading is also achieved by distributing land titles in order for the community to build their own housing through saving schemes. The framework that guides slum upgrading is participation. It is a term that has been in vogue throughout the policy world. It is perceived as the mechanism that can reconcile top down and bottom up desires. The hope is that by reconciling these forces, policy can reach a greater level of harmony and be more representative of the community’s desires. In the case of Nairobi, this framework has been used to deploy many of the city’s slum upgrading projects. In the 2014 National Slum Upgrading and Prevention Policy there is constant emphasis on the necessity for an inclusion of all stakeholders: NGOs, Institutions, structure owners, tenants, community-based organizations and faith-based organizations.

This report will examine the literature on top-down versus bottom-up approaches in project implementation in greater detail. It will analyze whether resistance can be conceived as a more inclusive reconciliatory (participatory) mechanism between top-down and bottom-up project implementation strategies. In the literature review, I will provide greater explanation on why this question was chosen, embedded in a more extensive discussion of top-down versus bottom-up literature. Briefly summarized, I argue that participation in project implementation is an ineffective tool to get good overview of the community’s demands and desires. Emanating from the primary and secondary sources employed in this research, I will argue that participation in slum upgrading projects is a tool that only allows the “elite” of informal settlements to participate. When speaking of elite, I mean the residents of informal settlements that have greater financial and social capital than their neighbors, but a more thorough discussion of elite will be covered in the literature review. These “slum elite” are able to maneuver themselves, employing their social and financial capital, making them the primary (sometimes the only) beneficiaries of slum upgrading projects. Instead of participation, resistance is what the rest of the inhabitants turn to. When I speak of the other inhabitants, I mean small structure owners, tenants and certain community based organizations. The reason why resistance can be a more effective reconciliatory tool between the project’s intentions and the community’s desires is that it is often more representative of the community’s wishes. Secondly, it is also a mechanism that slows down the project. The slowing down of the project enables the inhabitants to enforce certain demands, be it on a collective or individual basis and to
create alternative coping strategies. In case their demands are not met, it also allows the inhabitants to buy themselves time in order to create coping strategies for what might come next. In the absence of these two outcomes, we also have to consider the symbolic value that bottom-up resistance can have on the project in more humble terms: frustrating decision makers, taking an unpopular stance against the “elites” of the community, garnering greater community involvement around the project and opening up democratic debate in the closed spaces of participation. Nonetheless, resistance also has its issues, and as I will discuss, resistance often recreates its own inequalities, sometimes blurring the lines between participatory and resistance bodies. The report will focus on three slum upgrading projects within Nairobi: Huruma slum upgrading, Korogocho slum upgrading and Kibera-Langata Road Project.

The first chapter of this report gives an overview of the pertinent literature on this topic and will provide the theoretical framework for the rest of the paper. The literature review will be essential to guide the findings and discussion. As mentioned, it will provide a better understanding as to why the question was chosen whilst providing a comprehensive overview of top-down versus bottom-up literature and the gaps within this literature. In addition, the literature review will be dedicated to understanding what is “community” and how these entities can resist large projects. The second chapter of the paper will give a brief overview of each of the slum upgrading projects selected: Korogocho, Kibera and Huruma and the composition of the resistance groups. Chapter Three discusses the tools and strategies employed by these resistance groups and their challenges faced. Chapter Four will harmonize the three case studies, answering whether we can conceive resistance as an effective and alternative participatory tool.
Methodology:

This report was the result of a research internship with the International Alliance of Inhabitants (IAI). IAI’s activity in Nairobi has been running for over 10 years. The way they coordinate their activities on the ground is through volunteers such as Wilfred Olal and Humphrey Otieno who work with social movements in the city and rest of the country. IAI also has had special interest in the Korogocho slum upgrading project. The Kutoka Network and Father Alex, along with IAI, had been calling for greater debt transparency from the Kenyan government. It was their struggle that brought about the debt-swap program between the Italian and Kenyan governments to create the Korogocho Slum Upgrading Program. During the talks between the Italian and Kenyan governments, IAI and Kutoka Network lobbied, but failed to obtain a collective land title, a tool that would help reduce gentrification and protect tenants.

Due to the lack of tenant rights, my role was to document the forms of resistance, organized or unorganized, led by the inhabitants of Korogocho, and how these groups voiced their concerns. In order to get a more comprehensive view of “resistance against slum upgrading projects” I selected two other areas which would serve as comparative cases, Huruma slum upgrading project and Kibera-Langata road project. The reason why Huruma and Kibera were selected, was mainly due to the lack of prior research and journalistic work done on these areas. The Huruma slum upgrading project also had the advantage that, despite being run by a different organization (Muungano wa Wanavijiji), it had a similar organizational set up within the informal settlements. Furthermore, during my time in Nairobi, much of my work and leisurely activities brought me to the Huruma area, allowing me to establish close friends and contacts in the area. The Kibera-Langata roads project was chosen because it was a more recent project with little visibility. The time factor also provided for a good comparison to see how more recent projects affect inhabitants’ desire to resist and ability to organize. The road project was done in a non-participatory manner, which allows me to draw conclusions on whether it is more or less effective to resist a project with or without a participatory body. Similar to the case of Huruma, the contacts that I had established in Nairobi also allowed me to access the different resistance groups of the Kibera-Langata roads project easily. The different settings allowed me to adopt a comparative approach, cross cutting through cases to allow for generalizable analysis and takeaways (Yin, 326). Throughout the discussion of
the case studies, there will be constant reference to the theory employed, allowing for
generalizability but also addition and questioning of the theory used (Yin 2013).

As for my research, most of it was conducted through interviews and field visits. In
each area: Korogocho, Huruma and Kibera, I had friends who put me in touch with the
organizations executing the projects, community-based organizations, individual structure
owners and tenants. As previously discussed, the contacts created in each area came
through the organization I worked for, the IAI. It also meant that the object of the
interviews was to respond to the aims set out by IAI, to document resistance to slum
upgrading. With each of these members of the community, I held semi-structured
interviews for an average time of one hour. One of the major struggles was the limited
amount of time spent in Kenya and the representativeness of my interviews. It was
therefore that I snowball sampled, using already existing contacts to find other references.
This does raise issues of representativeness, but at least offers a wider range of views on
resistance (Small, 13). Another technique employed to increase my range of interviews
was to spend a lot of “off-time” interviewing subjects where discussions would be held
walking through their areas or whilst doing other activities. These moments allowed for
more relaxed settings where the interviewees would speak freely without feeling the need
to respond to particular questions, whilst also bringing me to see other people of interest.
These moments were also used to observe the interplay between the effect social class
and privilege had when interviewing. Equally I tried to relax the formal relationships held
when talking to interviewees, especially those who were frequently interviewed (Duenier &
Back 2006). To compensate for the lack of representativeness, I regularly worked on
analyzing the content of my interviews whilst doing my field work. As Corbin and Strauss
outline, this allows to fully understand the different aspects of the subject studied, whilst
also allowing me to identify the subjects that were missing from each case study (1990).
Again, the treatment of the interview during data collection also enabled me to engage
with the theory and redefine the theory as suggested by Strauss and Corbin. During my
observational field visits in the three areas (alone or accompanied), I also made sure to
collect sample sentiments about the slum upgrading projects through casual discussions
with the people I encountered. The observational field visits complimented the interviews
as they focused on the gathering a wider sentiment concerning the projects, rather than
having information coming from people directly implicated or implicated by choice.
Chapter 1: Literature Review and Conceptual Framework

1. Implementing large scale projects: a story of top-down versus bottom up

The way societal change is conceived, is through government led action. In consequence, project implementation became an inherently top-down process. In the last 30 years, academics have drawn more focus to the viable option of bottom-up implementation strategies. Despite the large volumes of work that have been done on the two forces of project implementation: bottom-up and top-down, it is safe to say that there is a strong perception that top-down practices still dominate the manner in which policies are executed. Furthermore, much of the literature that has been produced concerning project implementation has struggled to reconcile top-down and bottom-up strategies; largely due to the issues observed in the execution of participatory structures aimed at reconciling the two modes of implementing projects. The aim of this report is to engage with the existing literature and to provide a second option outside of participation, resistance, as a tool needed to consider and engage with in order to resolve project implementation practices.

1.1 Attempts at reconciling top-down and bottom-up:

Paul Sabatier’s work, “Top-down and Bottom-up Approaches to Implementation Research” serves as a fundamental text that explains the rifts between the “top downers” and “bottom uppers” implementation procedures. Sabatier’s work can be used as a tool to create synthesis between the two, something he attempts with the proposition of the “advocacy coalition framework” (Sabatier 1986). Equally, for this thesis, his work will also serve as a way in which to scrutinize how slum upgrading policy, under the participatory framework, has failed.

Looking at the top-down manner of implementation, much of the criticism can be grouped under the innate need for “top-downers” to view their world in a hyper-rationalized and planned manner. More specifically, figures such as Benny Hjern and Chris Hull state that the top downers focus far too much on central actors, cannot acknowledge different complex layers of policy, underestimate street level actors and that the distinction between policy formulation and implementation is futile (Sabatier, 1986). What transpires from Sabatier’s text is that top downers focus their attention on the legislative and executive cadres within which policy is formulated. This notion is furthered in Richard Matland’s work, where he states that top-downers have a desire for
generalizable policy recommendations (147). The criticism put-forth by bottom-uppers such as Hjern and Hull, is retorted by top-downers as over stating the importance of peripheral and street level actors. In short, top-downers see bottom-up advocates as too focused on the “human” level of policy decisions and executions, with far too little care for planning and central control of policy (Sabatier 1986). The work done by Sabatier is essential in highlighting what can be considered as two irreconcilable policy formulations. Although Sabatier does not state so explicitly, the manner in which bottom-uppers and top-downers are exposed in his work serves to demonstrate their inherent disagreement. The criticisms that bottom-up advocates have towards top-down advocates reveals exactly the flaws in their own thinking and vice-versa. They are the two missing puzzle pieces to the same puzzle, but they are made from different materials. Their incongruency stems from the differing motivations they have. Top-downers are concerned with execution effectiveness and the ability for government to steer these programs, whilst bottom-uppers are concerned with how policy is formulated but not with how it is implemented (Sabatier, 35-6).

Besides the different starting points, there have been attempts at creating models to reconcile the two. It is important to note that these models were however put forth by individuals coming from either a top-down or bottom-up background. The first model was Elmore’s forward and backward mapping. After Elmore’s model came the infamous advocacy coalition framework model by Paul Sabatier. In the 1990’s Gogin and his colleague’s developed the communications model of intergovernmental policy implementation. Neither of these models has had resounding success in the implementation world, and also is subject to a lot of theoretical criticism. Matland’s overview of all the reconciliatory models, depicts the difficulties scholars have when creating models that are both theoretically sound and applicable in practice. Like Sabatier, Matland comes to a similar conclusion, that the two schools emanate from different contexts, choosing to study different types of policies to advance their own claims (155). As for Matland’s own proposal, the ambiguity/conflict model too suffers from the hyper-rationalism that top-downers often promote. By delimiting possible modes of implementation into four different contexts (low ambiguity and low conflict, low ambiguity and high conflict, high ambiguity and low conflict, high ambiguity and high conflict), he is falling victim to what he himself sees as the chronic illness of top-downers: generalizability.
For the purposes of this report, the conflicts between top-down and bottom-up processes and the difficulty to reconcile the two dynamics serves as the backdrop to why we should take the participatory mechanism skeptically. Sabatier and Matland’s work show that decades of trials have been done to create models that balance top-down and bottom-up approaches, and that perhaps the participatory framework should be considered not as a final solution, but a step in the process to creating more efficient models in the future. Lastly, the work Sabatier and Matland have done will better help understand the position of bottom uppers. The research conducted focuses on ground up action in the context of slum upgrading projects. Consequently, a better understanding of bottom-up critiques of top-down practices, helps situate the interviews and other qualitative information in a context of bottom-up discourse.

2. Participation as a reconciling mechanism

To remedy the persisting gulf between top-down and bottom-up modes of implementation, a logical solution was devised-participation. Participation makes the inference, that communities and beneficiaries of policy often don't have a space dedicated to voicing their interests and concerns. This model differs heavily from the ones mentioned above, as it is the first time it directly involves the community. Hence, in theory, this space is essential to render inhabitants visible to and heard by decision makers. However, participation is not implemented in a singular way in policy structures. The way projects and policies conceive participation is up to their jurisdiction. This highlights the first issue of participation, that it is already the top-down practitioners who decide on what participation is (Swyngedouw 2009). Therefore, participation has many faces, which is why it is important when researching participative projects, to understand who is included and excluded. This segment will review the literature presented by practitioners and implementing institutions such as UN-Habitat, Muungano wa Wananvijiji (the Kenyan branch of Slum Dwellers International) and Kenyan National Slum Upgrading Program (KENSUP) to better comprehend what these institutions mean by “participation” in the case of slum upgrading.

Although UN-Habitat is an official partner on only one of the three projects, it is an influential actor in the domain of slum upgrading across the world and exerts influence on the way KENSUP operates. The UN-Habitat and Kenya Slum Upgrading Program Strategy Document outlines the need for all urban actors to take part in the slum upgrading, a regurgitation of the desires iterated by the likes of Sabatier (UN-Habitat 2008, 30). UN-Habitat also directly borrows from other urban theorists, such as Henri Lefebvre, when stating that it is a community member’s right to have a say in the process
of slum upgrading (UN-Habitat 2008, 30). In a similar document, the guiding principles state that the right to participate should be present at all stages of the project (UN-Habitat 2007, 16). Beyond just stipulating the need to participate, there is also a need to ensure the participation of society’s weaker members such as women. It is therefore important that KENSUP ensures that people do not feel discriminated and intimidated in this process (UN-Habitat 2008, 30).

A very similar stance is evident in the documents produced by the Kenyan Ministry of Land Housing and Urban Development. The word participation is scattered throughout their documents. Statements are made such as: “ensure stakeholder participation and accountability in slum upgrading” or “encourage, facilitate and secure community participation in integrated approaches of slum upgrading” (Ministry of Land Housing and Urban Development 2014). Nonetheless, the way this term is mobilized remains vague, perhaps even more so than in the UN-Habitat documents. From these two sources, we find that participation has many noble principles that drive it. For political reasons perhaps, both documents shy away from outlining how participation should take place and what mechanisms govern participation. Many questions are left untouched, such as: who (national, county or community) designs participatory bodies? what are the participatory bodies modes of engaging with government? How do members of the community and outside join participatory bodies? Simply stipulating that participation must be inclusive is not enough, a more prescriptive national policy would perhaps be better at ensuring certain requirements are met. In the absence of clear guidelines, simple policy recommendations as these can be easily appropriated by a multitude of actors, as will be explained throughout this report.

The way Muungano wa Wanavijiji (Muungano for short) organizes participation is different than the UN and KENSUP directives. For starters, Muungano labels itself as a grassroots movement. In Kenya they have around 1000 slum-based groups/federations with around 100,000 members (Muungano wa Wanavijiji 2018). These individual federations are the structures in charge of the local slum upgrading projects in their communities, within the directives from Muungano and Slum Dwellers International (SDI). Financially, Muungano is supported by Akiba Mashinani Trust (AMT). The way Muungano operates in informal settlements is set out on a bottom-up basis, hence the reason they regard themselves as a grassroots movement. The ground level groups in charge of the slum upgrading projects are called saving teams. These saving teams need to elect,
through acclamation\(^5\) a chairman, vice-chair, secretary and vice-secretary and treasurer. Muungano recommends that there be women elected, especially for the position of treasurer, a strategy they adopted from Slum Dwellers International (SDI). The local structures also have the choice to set up different “teams” within their community. These can be, land advocacy teams, projects teams or others of their choice. The organizational structure is defined by the overarching structures, yet Muungano repeatedly states that these structures are autonomous and the administrative branch of Muungano does not often intervene in their organizational structure.

Enumeration is the key stage that happens prior to any construction or rehabilitation of informal settlements. Enumeration is the surveying of the inhabitants (age, sex, status etc.), structures present, organizations, faith institutions and more, to get a better idea of what the target slum is comprised of. This stage is also meant to be done in a participatory fashion, as a key mechanism to ensure the accuracy and representativeness of the enumeration process. Once more, the outlining of how enumeration is executed remains quite vague and up to the implementing agent’s discretion. According to the UN-Habitat, there is a need for enumeration to remain flexible, as it is the key to its success and replicability (UN-Habitat, 9). Richard Matland mentions, generalizable policy is what leads to policy being suffocated by top downers, yet the lack of guidelines is troublesome. The UN also acknowledges the issues that can arise if enumeration is carried out poorly, leading to the slum upgrading project benefiting only a few groups or classes of residents (UN-Habitat, 8). In his work, “intra-settlement politics and conflict in enumerations” Andrea Rigon demonstrates how enumeration is a complex and error prone process (2017). “Simple” issues such as the miss-counting of inhabitants per household occurred when enumerators would not insist upon knowing the exact amount of people residing in the house, leading to systematic errors in data collection (Rigon 2017, 589). These errors then were often corrected on the spot, rather than carrying out proper data verification (Rigon 2017, 589). Jane Weru, from Muungano, also describes similar issues when enumeration took place in Huruma. Yet, Muungano devised a corrective mechanism, which was to hand back the enumeration to the community for them to verify (Weru, 51). Nonetheless, this does not solve all issues, as such a verification process can easily be coopted into the agenda of a person with power from

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\(^5\) Voting by acclamation is voting done by raising one's hand. As will be discussed later in the literature review, such voting procedure is prone to individuals being forced into voting for their structure owners or other powerful members of the community.
the given informal settlements. What Rigon (2017) and Weru demonstrate, is what bottom-uppers would categorize as the inability for top-down models to account for the strategies used by street-level bureaucrats (Sabatier, 30). Rigon (2017) and Weru’s examples are not necessarily strategies employed by surveyors, but could well have been. Regardless, it demonstrates bottom-uppers concern for the understated influence of street level bureaucrats are not taken into consideration with the participatory model.

The purpose of outlining how practitioners conceptualize participation is essential in understanding its flaws. This segment will serve the report as a basis on which we can later refer to when addressing the issues in participation across the three case studies studied. However, it is also important to note, that the ambiguity in some of the policy briefs is perhaps intentional, or stems from a calculated political decision. Firstly, institutions cannot be generalizing and, when implementing, have to have policy frameworks that is flexible to accommodate the terrain in which they work. As mentioned by the UN-Habitat enumeration document, it is never a neutral task to work in slum upgrading, therefore, ambiguity is a way to simulate impartiality. In turn, impartiality is essential in an agency’s capacity to execute programs and policies.

2.1 Setting up failure in participation:
So far, only some of the potential issues that arise with participatory structures in slum upgrading projects have been shown. To understand the issues with participation, we need to discuss the larger forces that shaped participation within the urban realm. Many argue that the popularization of participation was largely due to the neo-liberalization of urban politics (Roy 2014, Swyngedouw 2005). To better understand why neoliberalism created the space for participation, we have to turn to Neil Brenner and Nik Theodor’s book Spaces of Neoliberalism. This piece describes the common phenomenon of state withdrawal from (re)development, attempting to stimulate economic vitality from below. Relating this to the first section of the literature review, the state retraction from financing and supporting projects, is a way to create more horizontal ties rather than top-down implementation and allowing public private partnerships to immediately access the local level (Jessop, 199). Due to the retraction of the state, individuals and smaller collectives are propelled to replace the vacuum. It does mean that individuals have more direct ties and greater room for participation with private entities, yet smaller structures do not get guidance or protection from state structures, the only entity able to protect the individual
(Swyngedouw 2005). In other words, the “neoliberal order” is then able to realign itself with the informal, weakly regulated and the social economy (Jessop, 120). The overarching consequences of the political-economic restructuring we have and are witnessing, is that the field of (re)development, especially urban redevelopment, becomes an elite playing field where micro-level structures who are deemed “competent” enough are able to partner with market forces and financiers (Brenner & Theodor, 2002).

Throughout these texts we can question the overuse of the term “neoliberal”. Regardless, these authors describe the inherent logic that neoliberalism employs when structuring power relations, the logic of rewards and punishment. Those able to execute the needs of public private partnerships are rewarded, those not, are excluded. We therefore have to consider who is the governing agent of participatory or micro level bodies? If we assume the power dynamics described above to be true, we then have to reckon with the considerable amount of power private models hold on participatory institutions (Ghose, 64). Although private entities do dictate the rules of the game in today’s participatory bodies, there are more nuanced readings of who is able to participate. Ghose’s fieldwork in Milwaukee paints a more “balanced” picture, where the entrance of CBOs in Neighborhood Strategic Planning (NSP) process, has made the selected CBOs more efficient organizations and able to renegotiate state power (Ghose, 70). On the other hand, Ghose’s analysis begs the question why such organizations were able to penetrate the NSP frameworks. Ghose herself notes that participation and the engaging with bottom-up structures has meant that “neoliberal policies” have become “one size fits all” (64). One size fits all, is what Swyngedouw understands as the technocratization of politics (Swyngedouw 2005, 2009). The technocratization of politics occurs when organizations have to adapt themselves to the demands and norms of market-led forces at the risk of being excluded from urban programs and politics (Swyngedouw 2005, 2009). The reason that street level organizations often face a zero-sum game is due to the large amounts of money involved in urban regeneration projects.

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6 By neoliberal order, I make reference to what Niel Brenner and Nik Theodor describe as the restructured political-economic powers (private entities) that are able to glide in and out of urban spaces with little government intervention.

7 Read participatory bodies. The section: participation as the key reconciling mechanism? Has shown the lack of guidelines and regulations addressed to participatory bodies.

8 Micro level structures: Community based organizations, civil society, social enterprises, local administrations etc.
These large sums come with norms and targets needed to be attained, but are there to serve the interests of developers, large stakeholders and the upper/middle classes (Roy, 67).

2.2 Elite capture in slum upgrading

The general literature presented in the previous section has exposed the mechanisms that lay behind the façade of participation. With a better understanding of how participation came to the fore, preliminary assumptions can be made when considering the consequences on the ground. This next section will discuss the existing literature on participation and “elite capture” in slum upgrading programs, both in Kenya and globally. Much of the literature can be grouped under a similar argument, that participation leads to the institutionalization of inequalities (Rigon 2014, Zérah 2009, De Wit & Berner 2009). In other words, NGOs and practitioners are often victims of “singular representations of subaltern subjects which become complicit in deepening inequalities and disposessions” (Doshi, 846). Much like Brenwan Jones, Jan Nijman shows how micro-finance of housing has put many slum-based and community-based organizations as the primary agents in contact with banks and other global financial institutions. Both Jones and Nijman demonstrate that the pressure put by financial institutions and NGOs on informal settlement communities, means that these “slum” CBOs, federations and cooperatives are 100% accountable for the costs of the project. Despite Jones and Nijman not explicitly stating the following, we can deduce that only a certain “type or class” of slum-dweller is able to negotiate and reimburse a financial institution, a notion revealed in the introduction, when discussing Michell’s response to De Soto. In the case of Dar es Salam, Brian Dill finds that in order to attract financial resources, “local-level” actors have “remarkably similar” organizational structures. Furthermore, he finds that 25% of the CBOs have their websites in English, as a way to increase their visibility (Dill, 728). Dill reflects what Jones, Nijman and Michell have already produced, that participation is a strategy for market-based actors to find their competent local level partners in complex foreign terrains.

Rigon replicates a similar critique of participation in his paper on “elite capture” in informal settlements. His work in Kwa-maji⁹ shows the reader how the “elite” of the settlement were able to put themselves at the helm of the project and steer the project to their collective benefit. In many slum upgrading projects, the members making up the

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⁹ An acronym for a settlement in Nairobi he wants to keep anonymous.
participatory body have to be voted into “power”. In the case of Kwa-maji, Rigon explains how the elite (mainly structure owners) were able to convince implementing agencies to use the mlolongo voting system, whereby community members stand in line behind their preferred candidate for the 48 positions available (Rigon 2014, 264). What ensues is that inhabitants will stand behind their structure owners in fear of eviction. Rigon further explains, that if this manner of voting was not employed, the slum upgrading project would have been boycotted by the elite classes of Kwa-maji (2014, 270). Other tactics used by structure owners was to influence the enumeration stage, a way for structure owners to conceal the power they wield. Structure owners would tell their tenants to inform enumerators that owners lived with them (Rigon 2014, 268). Otherwise, structure owners would either register their properties with other family members or friends (Rigon, 2017, 590). This key text helps understand that, not only are participatory tools out of the reach for many slum-dwellers, but that once occupied by the “elites” of a given informal settlement, they are co-opted into the agenda of the elite group and become closed, de-contested spaces of village politics. In addition, this paper will use Rigon’s term of “slum elite”, the reason being that the field work carried out has been conducted in similar settings as Andrea Rigon’s. By elite, this paper will refer to the large structure-owning classes of informal settlements. It also refers to members of informal settlements who are the gatekeepers of projects and able to navigate the NGO/development discourse and in particular the participation discourse (Rigon 2014).

The romanticized view of participation, is that it leads to self-governance, but as Doshi points out, the powerful members of community are able to consolidate their grasp on power, a view echoed by Marie-Hélène Zérah. Romanticized forms of participation are similar to private contracting according to Zérah, where local leaders form cartels to execute the programs initiated by NGOs and others (872). It is not entirely the fault of CBOs to adopt cartel-like organizations in order to execute programs and policies, there is a strong pressure for bottom-up partners to be efficient (Brenner & Theodor 2002; Swyngedow 2005/9 ; Dill 2009). But the drive for efficiency equates to the inclusion of trusted members of the community, be it ethnic ties, gender or class (Dill, 737). This is the context within which participatory slum upgrading operates in Kenya. Coupled to this is

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10 According to the official report, voting by ballot would take too much time and resources and be vulnerable to corruption (Rigon 2014, 264).

11 Village in this case is not used in a pejorative way. In Nairobi, settlements are divided in villages, each village has a participatory body in charge of the slum upgrading project.
the highly financialized housing market and the international pressure from international institutions to disperse mortgage finance throughout Africa (Jones 2010). In turn, housing policy in Kenya has taken a turn to address the needs of the middle classes (Huchzermeyer 2008).

Many of the texts concerning slum upgrading rarely discuss what happens outside the participatory bodies and the structural issues it encompasses. At the very most, authors do note the general discontentment with participatory slum upgrading programs. This discontentment along with the systemic failures of participation shown in the literature, require the need to consider alternatives to participation, or the serious restructuring of participatory politics. Hence the relevance of the research question, can resistance be conceived as a more inclusive reconciliatory (participatory) mechanism between top-down and bottom-up project implementation strategies?

3. Understanding resistance:

The proposal of resistance as a reconciliatory mechanism between top-down and bottom-up implementation procedures, demands a discursive overview of what is understood by resistance. This section of the literature review will give the reader a better idea of which tools are available to resistance movements, the organizational capacities and the infrapolitics of resistance (Scott 1992). This will be essential in the latter stages of this report in order to evaluate the resistance observed on the ground. Lastly, such works also helps to understand the limits of resistance when faced with incredibly powerful implementing coalitions made up of NGOs, states, private financers and international organizations.

3.1 State power and urban rebellion:

Slum upgrading, like any other large-scale projects requires for the state’s ability to render legible the ground in which it is acting. Through Dill, Brenner & Theodor and Swyngedouw, we have noted how participation, through the setting of standards for bottom-up partners, enables implementing bodies to have a clearer vision of the territory they are entering. Yet a more important step precedes this, where the state or implementing institution must engage in legibility strategies. The birth of the modern nation state accompanied tremendous efforts to render society closer, and by closer I mean more legible to central administration. The main modalities to achieve this was, surveying populations and nature, urban planning and taxonomy (Scott, 1998). The city occupies a focal point in the deploying of legibility strategies. In their books, Scott and
Harvey both reference the “Hausmanization” of Paris to better understand state’s desire to exert power over unruly populations, and also the rebellion movements in retaliation. The main rational behind such urban policies is to render social realities and local forms of information closer to the ears and minds of decision makers (Scott 1998, 72). Today, slum upgrading (especially enumeration) is a way to render slums more accessible to the remainder of the city space and to the political-economic class.

Urban realms have been standardized, but another force is at play. According to Scott and Harvey, capitalism is another such force, serving to homogenize society. For Harvey, the setting in which this occurs most frequently, is the city. Rebel Cities gives us a glimpse as to why so much of the struggle against capitalism has been and should be urban-based. The central question is whether the urban experience can galvanize a united leftist/anti-capitalist movement since cities are the spaces of great inequalities, with politics and policies willingly ignoring the plight of the urban poor (Harvey, 29). In response, many cities have seen powerful social movements rise and fall such as, la commune, red Vienna, red bologna and the St. Petersburgh commune (Harvey 2012; Scott 1998). These urban social movements continue to rise and fall, yet the question is whether today the left can incorporate these movements in their agenda to create alternative urbanisms, mobilizing as right to the city as a global unifying force (Harvey, 137). Cities are expansive networks, which often proves difficult terrain to generate solidarity. When examining the water wars in Bolivian cities of El Alto, Cochabamba and La Paz, Harvey notes that one of the key unifying forces was the practicing of cultural festivities and activities (Harvey, 148). In similar fashion, Scott sees culture and cultural activities as the most effective tools for resistance movements to conceal themselves from power (Scott 1998, 72). Harvey borrows from Lazar when highlighting the necessities to reclaim the city for anti-capitalist struggle, “syncretic appropriation of political traditions, drawing on trade unionism, and indigenous democratic values and practices” (Harvey, 148).

3.2 The contraptions of resilience and limited space for resistance:
It is essential to understand why the city is a unique space of power exertion and (the challenges of) urban-based struggle. As many of us might have noticed, there is a new buzzword, resilience, which accompanies every element of society, from resilient policies and societies, to the titles of our self-help books (Bracke, 2016). Resilience is the latest neoliberal term to be employed in (urban) governance, and for Bracke, this term ensures that all other human or societal considerations come secondary to the attaining or
completion of said project, restructuring policy or whatever it is that is branded as resilient. There do exist more nuanced readings of resilience, with some even proposing that resilience and resistance are complicit elements in the struggle against subordination (Bourbeau & Ryan, 2018). Nonetheless, this thesis will adhere to Bracke’s thesis, that sees resilience as a tool to render communities and peoples capable to bounce back from (resilient) crises. In more explicit terms, Bracke proposes that we stop seeing human struggle/survival as the everyday practice of resilience, as it is fetishized by the economic and political institutions that bear great responsibility for the contemporary conditions of precarity that are (designed to be) met with resilience” (60).

Due to the pervasive nature of resilience, there are few options for communities to retort such politics. For many of the world’s poor, refusing or resisting resilience is unaffordable, it means “refusal of things that can only be refused at a very high price, such as work, shelter, care, bailout loans, or development aid” (Bracke, 72). The option that remains is collective action and force. Resilience for Bracke is highly individualistic in character, consequently a shift to an interdependent understanding of society we will have concluded a small victory in the struggle against resistance (72). The work of Bracke is fundamental in understanding how development policies, including slum upgrading, is framed and executed. Many of the resistant leaders are rebutted with a resiliency discourse, targeting resistance leaders and communities as the enemies of the greater good. Despite the weak conclusion of needing a more collective ontology of society12, Bracke’s work equally depicts the difficulties when resisting resilience. It is therefore that we must remain humble when evaluating resistance, to not equate the community’s resisting capacities as equal to the omnipotent ideology of resilience.

Before continuing on to discuss other contextual factors we need to account for when evaluating resistance, this literature review will overview, what it sees as the misguided muddling of infrapolitics and resilience. Distinguishing between infrapolitics and resilience will also enable the reader to get a better understanding of what this report considers as resilience. The work done on the Palestinian conflict by Bourbeau and Ryan proposes that infrapolitical adaptation strategies are necessary for Palestinians to lead a “normal” life. Bourbeau and Ryan argument revolves around the interpretation that infrapolitics is enmeshed in adaptive and resiliency strategies to enhance the subordinate’s position (228). While this report understands Bourbeau and Ryan’s proposal

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12 Very little consideration for what collectives are and their internal difficulties.
in the context they have studied, this report sides with Sarah Bracke’s thesis, as it sees resilience as a global strategy to force people into adaptation— the capacity to bounce back. This paper acknowledges the difference Bourbeau and Ryan put forth, between adaptation and acceptance. Yet, in the context the field work was carried out for this report, any form of adaptation would allow the proliferation of state and private sector agendas. Lastly, this report’s assumption is that we have to split the understanding of resilience between context’s of war and occupation, and political-economic agendas.

3.3 The tools that remain:
As this report has just explained, resistance, much like community, is a notion that cannot be romanticized or idealized as the perfect, attainable response to unwanted policies. Considering the difficult context within which resistance operates, we must therefore be open to a multitude of interpretations of resistance. The most important of such texts is James C. Scott’s text Domination and Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. The main notion Scott deploys throughout his book is that of “Infrapolitics”. In his or her desire to minimize material appropriation (extraction), the subordinate enacts “a host of down-to-earth, low-profile stratagems” (Scott 1990, 188). Derived from the word infrared, infrapolitics describes political struggle that is unnoticed, not seen as legitimate and does not correspond to the widely accepted norms of political struggle (Scott 1990). The reason for the invisibility of infrapolitics is “a tactical choice born of a prudent awareness of balance of power” (Scott 1990, 183). What can constitute infrapolitics is: poaching, squatting, desertion, evasion, foot-dragging, hidden transcript of anger, aggression, tales of revenge, use of carnival symbolism, gossip, rumor, creation of autonomous social space for assertion of dignity development of dissident sub-cultures” (Scott 1990, 198).

Equally, Harvey demonstrates that urban resistance does not have a singular face, but is made up of all sorts, “factory occupations, solidarity economies, collective autonomous movements, agrarian cooperatives (Harvey, 124). We therefore have to consider that, both in organizational form and in strategy used, resistance has multiple facets, allowing us to be tolerant when qualifying what we consider to be resistance.

Bayat offers a different rational as to why ‘informal people’ are unable to form collectives and thus enact their resistance in the hidden transcript. According to the author, there is very little capacity for ‘informal people’ to organize themselves and account for the future. The rare times where the ‘informal’ does organize is to counter immediate and visible acts of state repression. Because the informal operates outside of institutions on a daily basis, they lack institutional capacity to exert pressure, “since they
lack the organizational power of disruption” (Bayat, 58). As a result, the weapons they use are the quiet mass encroachment that they perform on an individual basis. In similar vein, Ballard’s review of the literature demonstrates how the poor mobilize quietly encroach onto development projects and other sources of income to alleviate their positions. More importantly, Ballard also advances notions found in other texts, that resistance tied to resilience strategies are not solutions and that it might also affect capitalist growth and accumulation else where (220).

A last contextual element to be dealt with, in order to have a full understanding of resistance, is the ugly tools resistance sometimes uses. At the base of it all, is what Rebecca Raby sees as the fluid and contradicting nature of resistance. In her study of adolescents, Raby notices the continuous building of one self’s resistance which perpetually involves the need to step out of one’s discourse to find new ways of thinking and behaving (Raby, 167). These other ways of thinking can be constituted of, class, gender, race, sexuality and many more. Rethinking the identity of oneself, or a collective can have unforeseen consequences, where the resistance body chooses to mobilize characteristics that are of exclusionary nature, to say the least. Returning to Doshi’s text on subjective redevelopments in Mumbai, the author notes how social movements display and exploit (in the negative sense) gender or ethnic ties to attain political aims. In the case of SPARC, an influential NGO in housing related issues, Doshi shows how they brought to the fore gendered (female) development discourse, portraying women as “practical solution-seeking agents of urban improvement” (857). The consequences of such a move were that women who were not working at home\textsuperscript{13} and men (who often didn’t work at home to begin with) were the losers of the negotiated agreement (Doshi 2013). Similarly, with National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM), mobilized their nationality and ethnic profiles in opposition to the “unjust” settlers coming from Bangladesh and Pakistan (Doshi 859). In the end, the NAPM got what it was looking for, after getting a plot of 50 acres to resettle the Mandala community\textsuperscript{14}. Doshi’s paper is essential to understand the “darker sides of resistance”. What she equally demonstrates is that in the face of such questionable tactics, the state is able to, in a differentiated manner (subjectively), let marginalized communities participate in their “right to the city”. This report therefore would

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13} The slum resettlement moved the inhabitants working outside of their homes, further away from their places of work
  \item \textsuperscript{14} The Mandalas are a long standing North-Indian and Muslim community of Mumbai, and historically faced a lot of repression by the Shiva Sena (Hindu extremists).
\end{itemize}
also like to provide a link between such described forms of resistance and the adaptation thesis put forth above. The mobilization of ethnicity, class, gender or race, is an adaptation strategy, bending itself to the hegemonic rules of the game. As a result, Doshi’s work will serve as a platform to discern between different forms of resistance, a spectrum between adaptive resistance and resolute resistance.

4. Treating community with caution:

Much like resistance, community, is not to be idealized (Brent 2004). We have already seen that many practitioners tend to imagine slums and poor communities as homogenous entities (Roy 2011; Doshi 2012). Yet this last section of the literature review will discuss what this report understands by the term “community”. A good understanding of community is needed, as much of the field work has focused on the resistance capacities of communities. Additionally, if we are to get a sound evaluation of the resistance capabilities against slum upgrading, then we must also lay the foundation for understanding the struggles and divisions within communities that try to resist slum upgrading.

The central theme which will found this report’s understanding of community is its elusiveness. In other words, the more you try to grasp the concept of community, the less understanding you have of it (Brent 2004). Therefore, no prescriptions should be given to community, instead, leaving it undetermined (DeFilippis et al, 12). Secondly and mistakenly so, community is always connoted as a positive entity. The reason being that we frequently associate community to a romanticized past of our societies (DeFilippis et al, 13). Putting aside the romanticized version of community, we find that communities are fraught with questions of race, class, gender and power (Brent, 218). At best, we can consider that what makes community, community, is that “it possesses a gravitational pull, a magnetic existence that creates real effects – at its best, social relationships of mutual care and responsibility” (Brent, 221). A similar reading is given by Manuel Castells when states that despite the objectives and outcomes of a community led movement, “its very existence produced meaning for, not only for the movement’s participants, but for the community at large” (61). What unites the three authors mentioned above is that community is a difficult concept to grasp, but that it is also a concept to be treated with caution and care. Furthermore, the three texts demonstrate that community is not something to be treated on its own, and it is most pertinent to look at it in combination with larger issues such as movements, ideology and struggles.
4.1 Mobilizing community:

A very brief introduction on the constitution of community has revealed the complex intangible nature of community. We will now turn to the difficult task of understanding whether community can be mobilized as a solid political unit. Some of the answers to this question have been revealed in the review of resistance-oriented literature, but we will now try unearth this question even further.

There is one uniting factor for community that can never be undermined. Sharing similar spaces, territories, institutions and thus similar lived experience (DeFilippis et al, 19). DeFilippis and colleagues then further argue that shared spaces will also lead to a unified reaction when incursions are made on that shared space, but as this report will demonstrate, it is not as simple as they put it. The ways in which community can form a unified reaction are outlined the five strategies found in Figure 1.

1. **Reactionary**: which try to turn back the clock to a prior, real or imagined, time and state of affairs;
2. **Conservative**: which attempt to maintain a status quo that resists the advancement of social, economic, and political justice;
3. **Adaptive/Reformist**: which accept the basic premises of the status quo, but try to tweak it a bit around the edges. They try to reform gross inequities to improve and maintain society;
4. **Radical/Revolutionary**: which use the language and realm of community as a basis to try to fundamentally transform the social relations of their time;
5. **Opt-out**: which use the context of community to try to withdraw from the larger-scale social relations of their time.

![Figure 1: 5 types of community mobilization (DeFilippis, 22).](image)

Nonetheless, the team of authors do have solid recommendations when it comes to radicalizing community that will be useful to compare with the situation in Nairobi. The first is to understand the context that community operates, the second is to transcend community’s actions beyond the confines of that specific community\(^{15}\), the capacity to act on different fronts with different tools, unite community to social movements, contextualize

\(^{15}\) Much like what Harvey repeats in his book, Rebel Cities.
the struggle in greater political struggles\textsuperscript{16} and to make a history, as in creating a reference point for the community and larger audiences (DeFilippis et al 2010). Notwithstanding the solid recommendations provided, there are some flaws with these propositions. This being said, this report assumes that DeFilippis and colleagues are aware of the difficulties to apply their recommendations in real life situations.

A good way to answer the propositions mentioned above is by looking at Steve Herbert’s work, “The Trapdoor of Community”. In sum, Herbert argues that community dissolves when too many conditions and pressures are put on it. Although Herbert discusses community in the context of devolved administration, his text is still pertinent as it outlines with precise reasons how community can be a “weak” self-governance structure. First and foremost, many do not consider to be living in a community, an assertion that this author found to stand when doing his field work in Nairobi (Herbert, 855). Secondly, many of the respondents in Herbert’s work themselves did not believe that community could achieve much due to two main concerns, individualism and representativeness (Herbert, 856). In short, other obstacles community members from all classes stated were: time, heterogeneity, personal agendas and more (Herbert 2005). Despite not having worked on community, Bayat offers a similar reading of community and its mobilizing capacities. Looking at squatters and vendors, Bayat notes how many refuse to share strategies, prevent others from joining them and settling in their vicinity (58). The juxtaposition of DeFilippis and Herbert resumes the issues of community very effectively, as it notes the great source of potential, yet often deceiving character of community.

From the field work conducted, community was one of the most employed words, for both good and bad. Hence, community is one of the main sources of sustainability and the first place an inhabitant of informal settlements will turn to. When discussing communitarian theory, it is noticeable, that community is a source for a moral agenda (DeFilippi, 101). Herbert’s arguments considered, this thesis will synthesize Herbert and DeFilippi to note the ability for a minimal mutual understanding based on a shared minimal moral order (DeFilippi, 102). Thus, there is a certain level of potential to create social movements from community\textsuperscript{17}. Nevertheless, it is important to return to the body of

\textsuperscript{16} Requires education/educating component of the resistance movement. Something not accessible (time, resources) to all social movements.

\textsuperscript{17} The vague wording to describe said potential was used on purpose in concordance with the literature on community, as it is an “ungraspable” entity.
literature on resistance in order to relativize the statement just made. Harvey, Bayat and Doshi have made it very clear that it is very difficult to sustain such community level movements, and that splinters within them do occur. Ergo, this report would like to reiterate that community-based activism can lead to subjective urbanism, where communities that are successful enough at resisting, have (some of) their demands met by government (Doshi 2013).
Chapter 2: Contextualizing slum upgrading in Kenya

As with many countries across the world, slum upgrading in Kenya was born with the announcement of the UN Millennium Development Goals. Millennium Development Goal 7.D has the target of improving the lives of at least 100 million slum-dwellers by 2020 (UN MDGs). Across the world, the UN enacted Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) with national governments to put in place programs aimed at attaining the MDG targets. On the 15th of February 2003, the Kenyan government and the UN signed an MoU where UN-Habitat would oversee the KENSUP in its pursuit of MDG 7 (Anderson et al, 2). In 2005, the government then further specified KENSUP’s program to better fit the attaining of MDG 7.D. By 2020, KENSUP was to have improved the livelihoods of at least 5.3 million slum-dwellers (1.6 million households) which would cost the Kenyan government Kshs 844 billion (Anderson et al, 2). The efforts of the Government of Kenya (GoK) and UN-Habitat was supposed to mark the end of a violent perpetual process of slum destruction and violent evictions (Weru, 49). As will be discussed later in this report, slum upgrading simply made evictions and slum destruction less visible and mediatized.

Besides the global objectives that fall under the attainment of MDG 7.D, there are other goals that the GoK and UN-Habitat have co-established. Slum upgrading has to be seen in a context of how the world and global institutions have conceptualized development. In the UN-Habitat strategy document, we find more specific slum upgrading objectives:

- Promote and facilitate broad-based partnerships utilising consensus building and consultation among all the stakeholders.

- Build institutional and human resource capacities at local and national levels for the sustainability of slum upgrading interventions.

- Facilitate the implementation of innovative and replicable pro-poor slum upgrading models through pilot projects, delivery strategies, and approaches.

- Assist the GoK in the development of financial strategies and the mobilisation of funds for slum upgrading.

- Undertake collection and dissemination of information for the promotion of sustainable slum upgrading practices and the provision of linkages to global best practices.
From the following excerpt, we get a clearer picture of how slum upgrading situates within a greater objective of “enabling” the poorest members of society to become “self-sustainable”. Especially the second and fourth objectives exhibit the overarching goal of the UN, to render these programs as autonomous as possible. Alongside the objective listed above, in the same chapter, the UN outlines other sustainability strategies such as delegated decision making and capacity building, aimed at minimizing the need for large institutional presence (UN-Habitat 2008, 29-30). In the literature review we have already seen that these tools are what Brenwan Jones criticizes for being self-help tools. It goes along with the neoliberal restructuring of the political economy that has led to less direct state or global institutional intervention. Instead, these practices such as capacity building, are with the aim of creating bankable slum-dwellers, able to “develop themselves” with the simple assistance of some UN guidelines and best-practices. When interviewing government officials, a very similar discourse was sustained, that government cannot do everything and is not there to help every individual. These same officials said that simply enumerating and dividing plots was already a major way that governments could help slum-dwellers, by raising their plot values from Kshs 20,000 to almost a million. According to them, it was therefore best to let the “market forces play” as a way to benefit slum-dwellers (KSUP, Interview, 2018).

Despite being a rehash of what has been already mentioned for large parts in the literature review, the evidence displayed above demonstrates the constrained arena that has been built for slum upgrading projects. In the same interview, the office of the KSUP also said that it is harder to come by funding for slum upgrading projects; pushing governments, para-state institutions, grassroot movements and CBOs to become more “innovative” (KSUP, Interview, 2018). The image of slum upgrading this report would like to paint is that of a highly competitive and exclusive environment. An environment where a complex patchwork of competing state agencies (KISIP and KENSUP), NGOs and inhabitants fight for their inclusion in the development of these lucrative projects at the expense of others.

1. Contextualizing the three case studies:

We now turn to a deeper understanding of the three slum upgrading projects in Huruma, Korogocho and Kibera. This segment will look at the area it is located in, why and how slum upgrading is carried out, the partners and institutions involved, and an overview of the participatory bodies involved in the project. The concluding remarks to just above show the starting point of this report, the strong skeptical stance towards slum upgrading
projects. By overviewing the case specific slum upgrading projects, this section will further enforce the failure of participation and the need for other alternatives, such as resistance.

1.1 Overview of the Korogocho slum upgrading project

Korogocho, the capital’s third biggest slum, is located to the east of Nairobi with two rivers forming its boundaries. To the East of Korogocho lies another important physical barrier, the Dandora dumpsite. Korogocho is composed of 9 villages (administrative sub-divisions), Korogocho A (KA), Korogocho B (KB), Grogon, Highridge A, Highridge B, Nyayo, Githathuru and Kisumu Ndago.

![Figure 2: Korogocho location (google maps)](image)

The main initiators of the Korogocho Slum Upgrading Program (KSUP) are the Kutoka Network. This network, based in urban slums, was campaigning against the demolition of slums across Nairobi (Kutoka Network, interview, 2018). The belief of Kutoka Network is that it is the government’s role to improve the conditions within informal settlements, especially as a key way to improve the lives of young slum-dwellers\(^{18}\). The network got the attention of outside organizations and the Italian Embassy who were key to their support. Another essential element in the establishing of the Korogocho slum

\(^{18}\) Note that slum upgrading is also viewed by informal-settlement based organizations as a general developmental policy as it is framed by the UN and GoK.
upgrading was the work done by the Kutoka Parish on Kenya’s Debt. Through past efforts, they were able to gain more transparency on where Kenya’s debt lay, which was used to raise awareness on who owns the debt: the people or central government (Kutoka Network, Interview, 2018)? In 2004, the network entered negotiations with the Italian and Kenyan governments to convert the debt into development (International Alliance of Inhabitants 2008). Besides the Kutoka Network, there were other essential network partners at the negotiations for the Korogocho Slum Upgrading Project. Amongst them was the Komboni missionaries and the International Alliance of Inhabitants (IAI). The final amount dedicated to the project was Kshs 210 million (KSUP). Equally the organizations mentioned tried to push for the allocation of a community land titled deed, in fear of individual title deeds being sold once allocated (Kutoka Network, Interview, 2018). Unfortunately, this was not achieved and today individual land plots are worth a lot of money. Nonetheless, the organizations present were able to uphold other desires held by the inhabitants of Korogocho. First and foremost, the inhabitants wanted to have sovereignty over the building design along with the provision of loans for construction that in turn they will reimburse. The inhabitants also wanted an efficient road and sewage network, rehabilitation of street lights for security purposes and the provision of health and education facilities (International Alliance of Inhabitants 2008).

There are several institutions and organizations in charge for the rolling out of the KSUP. We have already discussed the roles of the governments of Kenya and Italy, the Kutoka Network, IAI and Komboni Mission, the parties engaged in the debt-swap agreement. As for the execution of the physical aspects of the program, it is the KENSUP that is the lead agency in charge. KENSUP’s national partners are the: Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Housing, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Lands, Nairobi City Council (UN-Habitat 2008). Finally, UN-Habitat has also helped fund the project and help with technical assistance and capacity building training to the partners of the program (UN-Habitat 2008).

This report has already shown that the KSUP will be achieved through the allotment of private land titles. There are other options through which slum upgrading can be executed. The first is the building of housing and the second is titled deeds, that can be done in a collective of individual manner. As mentioned, the allotment of individual land titles was the decision chosen, influenced by two major factors. The first, that the funds available (Kshs 210 million) was not enough to construct houses which cost around
600,000 shillings each (KSUP, Interview, 2018) Secondly, the pressure from the local inhabitants, meant that the government was coerced into accepting individual land titles.

Figure 3: Different homes to be upgraded in Korogocho A

This decision must be contextualized, as in 2007, Kenya had just experienced the worst election violence in its history, violence which was very present in poorer settlements of Kenya (Rigon 2016). Consequently, the next year, the government was not willing to take controversial decisions regarding land issues, as it had a weak hold on power, and Korogocho was opposition territory (Rigon 2016). Once the ministry of land has allotted the titles, it is then up to the individual resident to commence construction. There are no limits placed on the construction, apart from sticking to the 30 by 30ft of the plot size. The way in which slum-dwellers effectuate the construction, is as Jones describes, inciting them to go to money lending institutions, making them bankable subjects. In the eyes of the government, this is something that is positive, as they are trying to incentivize private sector development in housing (KSUP, Interview, 2018). Besides the allotment of plots, the government has to build roads and sewage lines, plus provide amenities. The placing of roads often leads to displacement of peoples.

The principal participatory mechanism is the Residents Committee (RC). This participatory body has a Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer as its board. In each village
there is an RC team of six members made up of a chairman/woman, 2 landlord representative, a tenant representative, a youth representative and a women representative. These village level RCs are responsible for engaging the local inhabitants and convening regularly with the other villages and board members. In addition, the RC is the principal agent between the community and governmental bodies. Lastly, and most importantly, the RC is the body that oversees the land titling along with government surveyors. The literature review has outlined the main issue, that of the representativeness of the RC; that voting was done through the mlolongo system (Rigon 2014, 264). Therefore that many residents say that the RC has been hijacked by structure owners (Mboya, Interview, 2018). It is not just the voting techniques that have made RCs inaccessible for the common slum-dweller. It is also the difficult times during which the elections were taking place that meant many couldn't represent themselves, leaving the RC open to structure owners only (Rigon 2014). Participatory workshops are a state of exception where structure owners were able to bypass democratic and legal barriers to promote their desires such as individual land titles (Rigon 2017, 2771). Once dominated by the “elite” the RC becomes a closed-door institution, a body to deal with “like-minded” individuals that help out one another. Many residents complain that they are not informed about the RC meetings in each village, not to mention the general meetings. The general meetings used to take place in public, increasingly they are behind closed doors or even moved to different locations, inaccessible for many. If tenants have comments or queries concerning the slum upgrading, they are treated with disrespect and quickly dismissed by the RC members due to their status of tenant (Ndungu, Interview, 2018). It becomes obvious that the RC has been co-opted into the agenda of a certain class.

The most important issue concerning the RC, is the lack of political accountability. Their exclusive status within their community means that no one can question their presence within the RC. Initially, every RC member is to have a five year mandate, and elections are to be held. However elections have never taken place in the 8 years since the RC members were first elected. The main argument RC members have used against elections, is that they claim to be too heavily involved in the project to remove themselves from their positions (Wangare, Interview, 2018). The task of re-training someone for the position would be too much work, and they would take years to get where the incumbent members are. This discourse is defended by the officials in charge of the project, and as a result, no contestation is possible. Besides the contentious political terrain that government would have to navigate to hold elections, there is also the need to have
“efficient” community members in charge of a difficult project. As we have seen in the literature review, the structures of participation in the neo-liberal era call for efficient local partners. On top of that, there is now the disregard for political accountability (elections) at the local level, what Swyngedouw describes as the rise of the technocratic regime, the privileging those with the know-how (2009). It is therefore that the KSUP program manager defends the domination of competent structure owners in the RC. Their inclusion in the RC is also “logical” as they are the ones who invested in the settlement in the first place, they are therefore the stakeholders with the most to lose (KSUP, interview, 2018). What we see is the institutional promotion of an entrepreneurial risk-taking “elite” class in the realm of participatory bodies, confirming much of the theory on how participatory politics results in the institutionalization of existing inequalities. Moreover, it demonstrates how institutions consciously blur the lines between participation and private contracting (Zérah, 2009) In very real terms, those that try to vocally contest the positions of the RC members, end up dead. A few years ago, a young member of the community attended a RC meeting advocating for new elections within the participatory body; he was never seen the next day.

1.2 Overview of the Huruma slum upgrading project

Heading back towards town from Korogocho, one will most likely pass through or alongside Huruma. Located to the east of Nairobi, Huruma is bordered by Mathare to its west (another informal settlement) and the outer ring road to its east. To is North you find the Mathar river, that flows to the north of Korogocho. Huruma is composed of 6 villages: Kambi Moto, Mahera, Redeemed, Ghetto, Madoya and Githathuru.

The slum upgrading in Huruma was initiated by Muungano wa Wanavijiji. Similar to many of their other slum upgrading projects, Muungano had negotiated for a special planning area. A special planning area is where different construction standards are negotiated between government, the inhabitants and Muungano. This is done in order to allow the slum upgrading process to be done in accordance to the needs of the inhabitants (AMT, Interview, 2018). The reason Huruma was selected was that it made for an ideal laboratory (Alam et al, 23). Furthermore, there was a pre-existing “visionary leadership” according to Alam and colleagues, and this was largely due to the fact that some key founders of Muungano emanated from Huruma (Mwaniki, Interview, 2018). Other essential factors, were that Huruma did not have a history of violent ethnic conflict,

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19 For instance, an attempt to renegotiate the road width to 4 meters was done, but not approved.
as is the case in Korogocho, and relatively few tensions between structure owners and tenants (Alam et al, 23).

Muungano has the support of their sister institutions, Akiba Mashinani Trust, the financial branch overviewing the saving schemes and handing out loans to the community. Pamoja Trust also operates alongside Muungano as the support group for the different Muungano federations. Their work focuses more on the advocacy. Recently, there has been the introduction of a state agency in the project. The Kenya Informal Settlements Improvement Project (KISIP), has come to Huruma to place the roads and sewage lines. Unlike the Korogocho project, where government agencies are in charge of most of the slum upgrading; in Huruma, Muungano is only there to facilitate the construction of the houses. The arrival of KISIP has complicated and delayed the slum upgrading project according to Muungano (AMT, Interview, 2018). In Huruma itself, many people have complained that the laying of roads and sewage lines has further complicated their claims to land and have displaced people to make way for the construction.

The special planning area sets much of the ground work, enabling the beginning of the slum upgrading process. However, prior to the agreeing of the special planning area, there is also the essential phase of enumerations. With the help of the Indian SDI branch, Pamoja Trust was able to enumerate Huruma in 10 days (Weru, 51). As with Korogocho,
the enumeration process proved difficult, and was corrupted by different structure owner tactics mentioned in the literature review (Weru 2004; Rigon 2017). Apparently, to overcome these issues, the city council was invited to help which led to many inhabitants of Huruma realizing the benefits of giving correct information (Weru, 53). In stark contrast to Rigon’s work, inhabitants of Huruma were kept in check by their neighbors and community members, seemingly portraying a picture with an absence of elites dictating what community members should do (Weru, 54). After the enumerating stages, it is up to the community members to start saving. In Huruma, and elsewhere, the Muungano members save on a village basis. If one lives in Ghetto, they “have” to come to the community meetings and chip in what they can. On the side, every individual saves as well. The aim is, to save 10% of the house cost individually, with another 10% coming from the community savings pot, making the 20% deposit for the total cost of the house. Once the deposit is made, AMT then loans out the rest of the total building cost to the individual at a 6% interest rate. The total cost of the house has varied through the years with different factors changing the price, it was initially 160,000 shillings, whilst today it is Kshs 250,000\(^{20}\). The logic of savings groups is somewhat the logic of the survival of the fittest. Those able to save the quickest are first entitled to their house, often getting the best plots\(^{21}\). Additionally, if you do not save fast enough, you might altogether lose out, ending up in a plot of land in Machakos county for instance. Resulting in the complete disregard of the founding principles of Muungano slum upgrading: Accessibility, Availability, Affordability and Accountability (Mwaniki, Interview, 2018). Lastly, as is quite apparent already, those able to save the quickest are the structuring owning classes of Huruma.

Once the buildings have been built, the Muunganos then have to press for their title claims. The title deeds are given out on a community basis, as a measure to counter gentrification. Obtaining the title deeds is a lengthy procedure, and often loses momentum, as is the case with some villages. What complicates the process is the involvement of KISIP. In order to get a title deed, the community needs to have access roads and a proper sewage connection. KISIP, the agency in charge of roads and sewage provision has been struggling to get works underway. It can therefore take a while before

\(^{20}\) The factors influencing the price are: Muungano now requires more finishing on each house, building material costs have gone up and they no longer use local labor but a contractor instead (Interview, AMT, 2018).

\(^{21}\) The best plots are those with the most business opportunities.
a title claim is given out. Pamoja Trust is an essential partner in obtaining the title claim (Alam et al, 18). It assists in training the local Muunganos about their rights, lobbying for land, setting up local land rights committees in the Muunganos and opening doors to government that would have been otherwise inaccessible (Alam et al, 19).

Much like in Korogocho the structure of the Muunganos resemble the RCs. In each village we find a Muungano made up of a chairman, a treasurer and a secretary. These positions are voted in by acclamation during public gatherings. These individual Muungano representatives form part of a larger network, Kamar Ghema.22

![Figure 5: The Kamar Ghema Network meeting hall](image)

At Kamar Ghema, general issues are discussed such as land titling, major issues with the different villages and are the agency in charge of dealing with the Nairobi City County (NCC). The Kamar Ghema network has three board members, a chairman, a treasurer and a secretary. Inside the Network, there are also different committees that deal with the different elements of the slum upgrading project. These committees are not obligatory, nor are they mandated by the central Muungano and Pamoja administrations, instead they are

22 The network is a congregation of all the village Munnganos in Huruma. Kamar Ghema is an acronym for all the villages in Huruma.
recommended. The committees can be of a wide rage, savings committee, land advocacy, project committee and more.

The second similarity found between Korogocho and Huruma participatory bodies is the manner in which they exclude undesired community members. The manner of voting in Huruma is as questionable as it is in Korogocho. Local Muungano members are voted in through acclamation at public meetings (Mwaniki, Interview, 2018). Once more, it is very doubtful whether community members will vote for those they truly desire or the powerful men and women of the community. As a result, many of the community members feel that the structure owners are the dominant classes in the local Muunagnos and Networks (Chindi, Interview, 2018). As we have discussed, the Kamar Ghema network is a space for all the leaders of each village Muungano. Yet each village has the same criteria concerning those included in the community land title. The criteria are: you need to have lived in Huruma for more than 6 years, you have to attend meetings and you need to be a regular saver. The fact that each village has the same criteria for community title deed inclusion is not the usual way the Muungano structure operates. We can therefore also question if Kamar Ghema is a body that federates proceedings at a higher level, making sure every village follows the rules and guidelines. In the words of an inhabitant of Huruma, “Kamar Ghema, they pick the people they want for their organization” (Inhabitant of Huruma 1, Interview, 2018). The reason participation is done on an invite only basis is to produce “particular imaginations of the urban in line with the demands, dreams and aspirations of the included” (Swyngedouw et al, 214). Moreover, the criteria mentioned are highly demanding for an average inhabitant. Many tenants never stay over 6 years. To attend meetings, one needs to be free during those hours, leaving only the property-owning classes available to attend. Lastly, the ability to save regularly (and with what sums of money?) is also reserved to a certain kind of slum-dweller. When challenging the Muungano administrative bodies about local level implementation of exclusive tactics, they repeatedly said that it is the community that decides for itself. If there were serious issues community members could come to the Muungano offices, an offer that is rarely taken up. Furthermore, the directives of Muungano and SDI are that it advises and guides, it does not directly involve itself in community decisions. As a result, the Muungano administration renders itself partially unaccountable for the institutionalization of

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23 Not sure whether regular also means prolific, but we have to question whether this could be the case.

24 The Kamar Ghema meeting for instance, is on a Wednesday at 16:30.
community level inequalities. A repeated question presented in the literature review will be regurgitated here, is this a tool used by Muungano to ensure its efficient functioning as a CBO, at the cost of more equitable and fair policies?

Yet when we consider the arduous task of negotiating with the NCC for the allocation of a community title, it is no surprise that the “crème de la crème” are “invited” to the participatory bodies of the slum upgrading process. During the Kamar Ghema network meeting, there were a lot of complaints about getting community titles, saying that the government was being difficult. Not only that, but the Kamar Ghema was finding it hard to negotiate with AMT, as there were rumors that AMT would increase the interest rates on loans to 12%. These two factors have pushed the Kamar Ghema network to abandon much of the slum upgrading project. The 30 or so members are now saving collectively to start a new venture. They are looking to buy land outside of Nairobi, for financial reasons, and one of the potential business plans is to grow Miraa. Not only do we find an exclusive participatory body in Huruma, but that this exclusive body faces many challenges in dealing with the neoliberal arrangement that slum upgrading is today. “Even” the elite classes of Huruma find it hard to negotiate with NGOs who are adopting more competitive models.

Other manners in which the participatory bodies lead an exclusive agenda is the overall lack of accountability with the inhabitants of Huruma. Many residents of Huruma, no matter what village they are from, do not know who their chairman or woman is, and if they do, their chairman or woman rarely holds or does not inform them of the meetings. In turn, this often disincentives residents to save, as they no longer trust the Muungano structures. Moreover, few reports are given on where the money goes to, and when asked about, these queries fall on dead ears. As we have seen, with Kamar Ghema’s entrepreneurial plans, there are reasons for the residents of Huruma to be asking questions and to demand more financial accountability. All in all, there is very little trust from the inhabitants towards Muungano. After having witnessed the failures of Muungano in the other villages, a resident from redeemed said, if I have already been hit on the cheek, then why should I turn my face and allow them to hit my second cheek (Inhabitant of Huruma 1, Interview, 2018).

25 A popular drug consumed in much of East Africa.
1.3 Overview of the Kibera-Langata roads project

Kibera is located to the south of Nairobi, and is popularly known as “Africa’s largest slum”. North of Kibera is the Ngong road, and to the South is the Southern Bypass. Kibera has many villages, but those affected by the road are: Kichingio, Mashimoni and Lindi.

As the title of this subsection indicates, this project is not exactly a slum upgrading project, or at least not framed as one. However, this report will take this as a form of slum upgrading. Roads are an essential part to the slum upgrading projects as are other urban transit amenities. Furthermore, the implementing institution, Kenyan Urban Roads Authority (KURA), defends the project with a highly developmentalist discourse. It promises drainage along the road will improve, businesses will be able to thrive and services can be delivered (KURA, Interview, 2018).

Lastly, displacement of people through infrastructure projects presents the opportunity for relocation. Instead of leaving people to their own devices, KURA with the support of government could relocate the victims, as was the case with the railway relocation program. For 60 years, different governments have had plans to build the road that would link Ngong road to the Southern bypass. In 2014, the government gave the final go-ahead. The Kibera-Langata link road is one of the last roads to be completed as part of a city-wide scheme to ease the traffic in the areas surrounding the CBD. The other roads
that have already been complete, create a belt shape around the city, acting as a mini-
Nairobi ring road. It has been 2 years that the project has started, and the construction is
still in infancy stage. KURA along with H. Young as their sub-contractors, have asphalted
a fragment of the road, leaving the houses untouched. Nonetheless, the official timeline is
that it will be completed within the next year and a half.

From KURA’s perspective, the major challenge is how to negotiate or engage with
the communities that will be affected. It is therefore highly unlikely that the road will be
completed within the next year and a half. KURA views the people living in Kibera as
being illegal settlers, and therefore sees it within its right to evict these people out of their
homes, with little or no compensation26.

Figure 7: President Uhuru Kenyatta opening Ngong road phase 2,
around the corner from the Kibera-Langata road

Since this is not a conventional slum upgrading project, there is no recognized
participatory body. As a result, KURA is forced to directly engage with the residents of the
affected areas. In the Kenyan constitution article 10 enshrines the right for participation.
Equally, a bill passed in 2016, further enforces that right (Senate Bills 2016). Participation

26 It is very unclear whether KURA will compensate the people affected. It is legally required to do so, but
antecedents show that the legal requirement to do so, is not always followed.
has to be ensured by the implementing institution and must be fair and equal to all (Senate Bills 2016). Regardless, KURA discloses very little information about the roads project and rarely comes to meet with the affected people. The main source of contention concerning the road, is that the plans have changed over the years. When comparing the official KURA plans for the road project and the shape of the road today, it is very clear that the road is not following its intended path. From what I could gather from the inhabitants, there have been at least 3 separate plans for the road, with some claiming even 4. In turn, the affected peoples must source their own information through unclear channels, creating confusion on initial road plans and why they have been changed. The confusion created by the KURA also benefits them as it means they can operate without transparency and accountability. Another element which further complicates the story: in 2013, Kibera and Langata became two separate constituencies, leading to the construction of new constituency offices in Kibera DC area which lie on the original road reserve. What is difficult to grasp is why government offices were placed where they were when they are the custodians of the road plans (Interview, Nyagesera, 2018). In the absence of clear information, many suspect that there were powerful tribal or political groups that lobbied for the construction of offices to defend certain neighborhoods of Kibera (Interview, Nyagesera, 2018). The fact that no participatory body is present serves as a useful case study, to denote whether there are differences in how the resistance is led. Our main question regarding the Kibera case study will be whether people align on more equitable lines than in participatory bodies. By equitable, we mean whether it will be less divided among classes, each representing their own interests.

The outlining of the cases three cases of slum upgrading demonstrate the tendency for such infrastructure projects to be carried out by employing existing community inequalities, with little room for inhabitants to demand for accountability. As we will discuss later, the way government interacts with resistance groups often reproduces these inequalities, especially in when met with splintered resistance groups. Nonetheless, the take away from the two cases of slum upgrading demonstrate that participation frequently serves to the benefit of implementing institutions. This façade of participatory democracy is advanced by implementing institutions to exclude the undesired and “difficult to manage” community members. On the odd occasion when community members bypass their participatory bodies to vent their complaints to the institutions themselves, they are told to deal with the members of the RCs or Muunganos that they elected. In the absence of a participatory body, the inhabitants of Kichingio, Mashimon and Lindi have to
demand for greater transparency. This proves a difficult task when the implementing institution is exempt from democratic proceedings, becoming as much of a technocratic institution as the logics of slum upgrading. In turn, community members are compelled to lead counter movements to resolve or at the very least, clarify the aims and intentions of the practitioners in each case.
Chapter 3: Who are the resistant groups?

In every settlement mentioned, there are people that have formed or loosely formed counter movements to the projects that are currently taking place. This chapter will discuss: their organization and composition, their agendas, the timeline of their resistance, their relation to participatory bodies and the strategies used. Chapter 3 will set the ground work to understand the resistance movements and its ability to create a more inclusive platform than the participatory bodies of slum upgrading projects. Following, we can then answer with more certainty whether resistance is a more effective reconciliatory tool than participation.

1. Resistance groups in Korogocho

The most notable and organized form of resistance in Korogocho was led by the Korogocho Owners Welfare Association (KOWA). As the name indicates, this group of structure owners led a court case against the government to claim the land (Weru, 50). KOWA managed to stall the initial phases of the upgrading project, leading to momentary withdrawing of government support for the KSUP. Eventually, the KOWA lost the court case, yet the group still exists today, although having less influence than before for the purposes of this report, KOWA will not be discussed in depth as it no longer operates with a lot of effect.

1.1 Organization of resistance bodies in Korogocho

For the most part, resistance in Korogocho is a very individual process. There is a general discontentment with the form the slum upgrading has taken, largely due to the way in which the Resident’s Committee (RC) has been handling the project (see chapter 2). This discontentment has led to people frequently encountering RC members to challenge them about proceedings. KSUP has been going on for more than 10 years now, this has made it hard to sustain a resistance movement due to a perceived slowdown in the project (Interview, Ndungu, 2018). More recently, there has been increased resentment, in part due to the presence of surveyors who have come to help continue the land titling process. Around Christmas of 2017, there were surveyors who had come to Korogocho A to subdivide the land. This led to inhabitants of Korogocho A to gather at the RC offices and create a spontaneous demonstration. Their main revindication was that they had not been told and consulted before the arrival of government surveyors. Moreover, they feared that due to the lack of communication from the behalf of the RC, there were going to be
unequal divisions in the land (Mboya, Interview, 2018). Other issues that angers community members is the access roads. The first visible stage of the slum upgrading was the placing of access roads. The anger directed at the access roads did mainly come from structure owners. Many recognized the need for these roads and their benefits. What they did not agree with was that the RC did not release the plans of the roads before-hand and the relocation of structure owners to undesired areas too close to the river or having to share plots with more than 2 other structure owners (Ndungu, Interview, 2018). Lastly, a big issue is the poor allocation of land titles. Korogocho has been divided into plots of 100 square meters. This number was the optimal allocation of land per person. In the case that there were more structure owners than plots available, some structure owners would have to share plots with 3,4,5 or more others (Korogocho Chief, Interview, 2018). What residents reproached the RC, was the way people were selected to share, with those less powerful and with no ties to the RC losing out (Ndungu, Interview, 2018). The residents knew very well that there were more powerful structure owners employing different tactics to not loose the amount of lots they had (Rigon, 2017). Moreover, there are many rumors that power structure owners were able to get more than one plot per person (Ndungu, Interview, 2018). As for tenants, we will see in section 2.2 how tenants appropriate their secondary status. If there are plots remaining, some villages have considered a certain number of long-term tenants as beneficiaries. These village RC have given 6 title deeds to a group of tenants. Each title deed is shared by 4 tenants, giving a total of 24 tenants in a select few villages (Korogocho Chief, Interview, 2018). Compared to the number structure owners benefitting, this is a minuscule number, especially considering tenants are the majority in Korogocho. Yet as will be further detailed later, tenants do not resist as vociferously as structure owners. Hence, there is little potential for class cutting collective forms of mobilization, despite shared attitudes and resentment towards KSUP.

Apart from individual forms of resistance, there have been successful collective forms of resistance. Most of this has been organized by an infamous youth leader, and National Youth Service (NYS) Korogocho leader called James Walainaina, also know as Uncle. Using his position of youth leader and respect of many community members, he and his friends organized public meetings “barazas” to force greater transparency and accountability on the behalf of the RC. Their idea was to go to each village and hold discussion sessions about the issues the community members were facing. The people attending these meetings were not of a particular tribe, gender or class as they were open
to all. The main rational was to give a voice to the community that would otherwise have been disregarded by the RC (Walainaina, Interview, 2018). Despite the success, it was very difficult to incite people to participate at the barazas, people were scared of voicing their anger and some had already suffered too much from the upgrading project (Walainaina, Interview, 2018). In general, resistance is hard to garner in a community as Korogocho, because those who openly resist are physically hurt or worse. As a result, many do not consider resistance a battle worth fighting (Interview, Ndungu, 2018). The many meetings held in different villages meant that the RC feared the mounting pressure and resentment that was galvanized by Uncle. It culminated in a baraza held by the RC where Uncle was given a microphone to speak. Instead of speaking himself he gave the mic to an old lady and a young boy in order for them to present their desires for the slum upgrading (Walainaina, Interview, 2018). The next day, the young boy who spoke was kidnapped, with many believing it was the work of the RC. The community retorted, and demanded the return of the boy, which eventually happened (Walainaina, Interview, 2018). This is to show that resisting such powerful RC members also requires powerful and influence wielding community members to be able to match the force of the RC (Mouchard 2010). Without the help of figures such as Uncle, resistance is very dispersed.

Besides Uncle and his youth mobilizers, Koch FM is also an integral structure in bringing about dialogue concerning the slum upgrading. Koch FM, which shares its space with the chief’s office and RC, hosts inhabitants to come and discuss their issues concerning the slum upgrading. They used to also host debate sessions between the RC members and the inhabitants. The RC members quickly pulled out as they felt that the inhabitants asked too many tough questions they were unable to answer (Ndungu, Interview, 2018).

1.2 Timeline of the resistance in Korogocho:
Since the inception of the project there have always been micro forms of resistance against it. The work of Uncle and his colleagues took place during the years 2013 to 2015. It slowed down there after, with Uncle wanting to go into local politics. He did not get elected in 2017 and is now back with the NYS. However, in the mean time he has been gathering more evidence and helping out individuals with their personal battles against the RC (Walainaina, Interview, 2018).

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27 Koch is short for Korogocho.
1.3 Resisters’ relation to participatory bodies

Quite obviously, communities are not spatially divided on political or ideological lines. Therefore, relations between resisters and RC members are very intertwined. The daughter of the RC treasurer, was an old member of Koch FM, highlighting the proximity many resisters or project sceptics share with RC members or project supporters. As we will see with the case of Huruma later on, many of the RC members are considered to be respected (elder) members of the community. Therefore relations with RC members demand courtesy and respect, especially when one considers the way RC members consider themselves. In an interview, the RC treasurer said, “you see, us RC members are not equal to the rest of the community” (Wangare, Interview, 2018). RC members know very well who or which area of Korogocho is in opposition to the upgrading project. If desired, the RC can target you for being too vocal against the project. The resulting relationship between resisters (individuals or groups) is very strained to say the least. What salvages the resisters is their safety in numbers, and the general shared sentiment with a common rhetoric. Those who are not in the RC or close members will often say that the RC is a cartel caring for those it is close to. Many similar sentences are often repeated when inquiring about the slum upgrading project in general, it is the manifestation of the hidden transcript. Hidden, but public enough to reach the RC’s ears, whilst ensuring that it is not traceable to a single individual or solitary community. Hence, there is no need to say that very little direct dialogue exists between the everyday resident and the RC. These temporary relationships only appear when there is the dire need for the resident to resolve pressing matters with the RC

1.4 The strategies used by resisters in Korogocho

On a individual basis, much of the resistance can be summarized by infrapolitical resistance. Again, there are serious repercussions pushing people to be as cautious as possible when confronting the RC. There are a common set of actions that resisters pursue in Korogocho, the first and most popular is general slander of the project and the members of the RC and their close associates. Secondly, they are numerous to demand the return of public barazas that used to be held by the RC, to demand explanations concerning land titling and access road of collective movements coupled with pressing

28 Many people were not willing to be interviewed concerning their views of the slum upgrading project.

29 A topic we shall discuss more in chapter 4.
needs, community members will then go to the displacement by the RC. This request has never been met. As explained above, in the absence RC and hold personal talks in attempt to get their demands met.

Figure 8: Houses marked for demolition to make way for the access

The collective strategies that have been employed by Uncle and his colleagues are quite diverse. What they unites them is the desire for individuals in the movement to remain anonymous or at least allow the boisterous individuals to be unidentifiable. Once more, this is to conceal the identity of members who would otherwise be vulnerable to RC retribution. To attain communities, Uncle will send different people to different villages to disseminate key information concerning the RC. The same technique is used to call barazas in different villages. In order to get host successful barazas Uncle will invite 3-4 or “ice-breakers”, people he trusts who are not afraid to share their opinions concerning the KSUP. This will then ensure that people feel that they are in a comfortable space to speak honestly (Walainaina, Interview, 2018). At the public meetings, many issues will be discussed, but the main point of contention that was voiced by the community was the victims of the access roads. The construction of these roads has successfully been stalled by a backlash led by Uncle and his followers. The concerns inhabitants had, was that
when moved to different areas, they were settled in unfavorable areas, or worse, they would have to share a title deed with 3, 4, 5 other people (Walainaina, Interview, 2018). James Walainaina claims to have stopped the roads in Korogocho. When walking around today in Korogocho, you find rows of houses with red crosses marked on them. Whether or not these have not been demolished due to Uncle’s work and the meetings is questionable, but they certainly had a role to play. What might have been essential to the stopping of the roads, was the decision to have many old women speak at the barazas. As Humphrey Otieno explains, a common tactic used when defending against slum upgrading is to show a face that everyone can empathize with, usually the face of an old lady (Otieno, Interview, 2018).

Contrasting Korogocho to Huruma, the major advantage that Korogocho has is the presence of people such as Uncle, and the Koch FM team. These are people and organizations with established reputations in the area, making the forces that can galvanize support and become respected by the members of the RC. Without the presence of Uncle and Koch FM, there would be little desire for community members to take the responsibility to lead movements against the powerful RC structures in fear of their own security. The last option would be to speak directly to the governmental institutions, but this is an option little considered by the inhabitants of Korogocho, as they are often told to deal directly with their “elected representatives”.

2 Resistance groups in Huruma

2.1 Organization of resistance bodies in Huruma

The first striking similarity is between Korogocho and Huruma is that resistance is carried out on an individual basis as well. While there have been successful attempts and globalizing resistance in Korogocho, no such attempt has worked or even taken place in Huruma. Within the participatory bodies of the village level Muunganos, there have also been many internal tussles, especially in Ghetto (Mwaniki, Interview, 2018). In fact, it is only in Kambi Moto in which the project is more or less completed. Many say that this is due to the regular turnover of power within Kambi Moto, where frequent elections were taking place, the only village to do so (Mwaniki, Interview, 2018). This is not to say that the Kambi Moto project was completed without any issues of exclusion or displacement. As for Ghetto, at a certain point there were two competing Muungano structures. The original members who had been voted in during the early 2000s and what is known as the “new Muungano”. The “new Muungano” started because many of the young people of the
community felt left out of the process despite being the largest group present in Ghetto. The “new Muungano” then set up a competing savings group to carry out the same mandate as the initial Muungano had done. What ensued was that the initial Muungano gave up its mandate in Ghetto and bought a 40 acre land in Machakos county to start a new venture with its 150 members (Mwaniki, Interview, 2018). Today the “new Muungano” is the sole Muungano savings group in Ghetto. Yet much of the criticism the young Muungano members directed at the intial Muungano, can be held against the “new” Muungano as well.

Besides competing Muungano groups, there are no other organized forms of resistance. The closest found is that there are “collective” movements that refuse to save, especially in the villages of Ghetto, Mahera and Redeemed. This said, there is no coordination of the individuals that refuse to save. Instead, the resistance against slum upgrading is done by general discontentment and distrust of the Muungano savings groups. A discontentment that forces individuals in a strange form of collective individual action in search for alternative futures (Bayat, 58). From observation work done, there seems to be little intra-village organization and strategy formation between resisting individuals. Bringing it to a street level, there are entire streets that choose not take part in the slum upgrading project, nonetheless this does not materialize in meetings held or desire to form resisting collectives. Despite DeFilippis and his colleagues proposing that shared space and experience can create the foundations of a communitarian movement, this is not the case in Huruma. Or perhaps, we are still at the infancy stages of that movement. There are signs that people are behaving in similar ways due to the form in which slum upgrading is taking place. People in Huruma are at best, loosely bounded together by a common set of actions. What is inhibiting them from that action gathering momentum is the regular strife within Muungano groups, leading to a lack of visible progress of the project. In villages where there is no strife within Muungano savings groups, some leaders are said to be incompetent and uninterested in advancing the project (Inhabitant of Huruma 2, Interview, 2018). In sum, the organizational structure of resistance in Huruma is bound by the common methods employed on an individual basis. The fact that there is a very slow but incremental approach to slum upgrading, gives the impression that only a few individuals at a time are being displaced or not receiving the homes promised at a time. It is unsure whether in the future, this organizational base will solidify into something more structured and organized.
The composition of this group of resisters is mainly comprised of two categories. Single structure owners, those who live in their structure, and tenants. These two categories of people can be of different ages and family statuses. Furthermore, there is no single ethnicity/tribe that dominates the group aforementioned. Nevertheless, in the case of Huruma, tenants are de facto resisters. Like in other slum upgrading projects, they are very rarely taken into account in slum upgrading projects. The general view is that this category of slum-dweller comes last in slum upgrading projects, as is reflected in the collective land title criteria mentioned in chapter 2 section 2. Again, slum upgrading is a game of who can save the fastest in order to build their house. When the new houses are built, amenities and roads are placed and sewage lines added, the land is far less dense than it was before. As a result, there is not enough space for all the inhabitants that once lived in the village where the slum upgrading took place. Tenants are the least likely to save up in time to build their house. Rather than vehemently resisting slum upgrading projects, often times tenants re-appropriate the logic of participation, considering themselves temporary, moveable residents with little rights to an “upgraded” house. Consequently, they de facto form part of the resisters by their refusal to save, but due to their self-perception and imposed status as “secondary class resident” they will rarely partake in other resistance strategies. Hence, tenants often are the first to leave Huruma when slum upgrading takes place, meaning that they are highly dispersed group, which adds to the difficulty of mobilizing this category of residents. Kambi Moto, being the first completed no longer has many tenants living in the area (Chindi, Interview, 2018). There were initially tenants as part of the Muungano savings groups, but quickly came to realize that this project was not accessible to them. In the end, after attempts at resistance, these groups left Huruma altogether and no longer participate in its politics (Chindi, Interview, 2018).

2.2 Timeline of the resistance in Huruma:
There have been few “monumental” or standout events that have occurred in the face of this slum upgrading project, as a result, there is not a precise timeline to be given of the resistance in Huruma. The events mentioned above between the “new” and “old” Muungano occurred in the years 2004-2005. Besides these disputes, we can qualify the resistance as an everyday practice, or up to the discretion of the resister.
2.3 Resisters’ relation to participatory bodies

Being a resister to a slum upgrading project is a delicate balance of voicing your discontent, whilst maintaining a working relationship with your neighbors and community members who might hold positions in Muungano. Those working in Muungano structures, have a good idea of who is a resister, or better said, non-participant, thus, it is impossible to be anonymous or hidden. It means that those who chose not to partake ensure they don’t expose themselves too much or become too vocal\(^\text{30}\). Furthermore, Muungano members are often elderly people of the community or people of a certain status whom command respect. Therefore, the general manner non-participants engage with local leaders is of simple courtesy, with the underlying acknowledgement that both hold opposing views on village matters.

One of the inhabitants interviewed is the neighbor to the son of one of the signatories of the slum upgrading project\(^\text{31}\). This inhabitant along with a few of her neighbors were all willing to share their worries concerning the slum upgrading project\(^\text{32}\). It is a public secret that this area of Huruma does not save, does not attend meetings and openly gossip about the project and its shortcomings. Living next to one of the key figures of the project, does not put the resisters in immediate danger. The minimal price for resisting is that those involved in the project do think of them negatively and might influence other community members to think so as well. It also means that the inhabitant interviewed, along with this area, gets a reputation of being against the progression of the community as a whole. Because there is a large group of people resisting to participate in the project, it means they have comfort in numbers and can resist the pressure of those who think negatively of them. Moreover, their forms of resistance are largely imbedded in what Scott calls the hidden transcript. Their actions are never very visible and are always on the limit of what is considered as more or less acceptable, or the norm in certain areas of Huruma. This too, minimizes their risk in daily life and ensures their relationship with members of Muungano.

\(^{30}\) When interviewing resisters, they would make sure they were in safe environments before speaking. They would change their behavior when they saw a Muungano member approach.

\(^{31}\) The signatories are those who signed the agreements with Muungano and government to initiate the project.

\(^{32}\) The area has not been mentioned to preserve the anonymity of this interviewee.
2.4 The strategies used by resisters in Huruma

The absence of an organized collective means that the strategies or techniques available are seriously reduced. Most of the strategies have been outlined throughout this section and fall under the infrapolitical side of resistance. These are: refusing to attend meetings, refusal to save, gossiping about Muungano failures and general disinterest in the project. The effects of the modes of resistance will be discussed in chapter 4. As for now, we will resume it to the fact that these strategies also help slow down the project, or at least give a perception that there is little momentum behind the project. In concrete terms, the fewer people save, the fewer resources a village level Muungano has for its project.

What is behind the successful resistance in Redeemed is the unlikely and implicit relationship between slaughter houses and inhabitants.

![Figure 9: The construction of a plot of land sold to an independent investor](image)

Redeemed has been one of the most resolutely anti slum upgrading areas of Huruma. Many say they were dissuaded to participate when they witnessed the displacement, lack of transparency and little consideration for those unable to save in the surrounding villages. It spontaneously led to the near dissolution of the Redeemed Muungano, which is very inactive today. Another faction that has never been interested in the slum upgrading
project, is the large business community of goat slaughter houses. These business owners have reportedly very little contact with Muungano structures, but are also not favorable to the slum upgrading project. It therefore means that it is very hard for Muungano to operate in a hostile area like Redeemed. This hostility materializes in the rare open defiance of the slum upgrading project when structure owners prefer to sell their structures to investors from the slaughter houses rather than save and have it become part of the slum upgrading project. An owner of a small home who was interviewed said she would not hesitate at selling her home if the opportunity arose, citing that at least there she knew what she would be getting into rather than the obscure project of Muungano wa Wanavijiji (Interview, Inhabitant of Huruma 4, 2018).

3. Resistance groups in Kibera

3.1 organization of resistance bodies in Kibera

Due to the inexistent participatory body in the Kibera-Langata roads project, the way resistance has formed in Kibera is far different than in the other two areas. For starters, there is a far more organized form of resistance. Meaning that there are recognized groups, who hold regular meetings and have the support of external agencies. Their organization is far more regimented and with a constant check on who is included and excluded.

The first group of resisters is known as the Egesa group. Egesa is a local school run by Peter Nyagesera. The Egesa school will be one of the victims if the road project goes through. Peter and his team of petitioners were one of the first groups that went to court, a move that has bought a considerable amount of time for the rest of the affected community. The initial aim of their court case was to divert the road back to its original path. In recent times, the Egesa petitioners have carried out valuation of their properties. This move was done to have a clearer idea of what their properties were worth and thus have a stronger bargaining position. However, it has led to others questioning whether the Egesa petitioners have opted instead to seek for compensation due to the frustrating process it has been to divert the road to its initial plan. The main members of the Egesa case are made up of local leaders from the Kichingio affected area. The local leaders are faith-based organization (FBO) leaders, structure owners, CBO leaders and elders. Each of these “leaders” then accounts for their own constituents. For instance, if one is a structure owner, he or she represents his or her tenants in the Egesa case, likewise for
FBO or CBO leaders. This mode of organization has drawn its fair share of criticism for its lack of representation and ability for the “average” community member to participate.

Within the Egesa court case, another movement has started, where a select group of structure owners have discovered that they are on the property of the Royal Nairobi Golf Club. The Golf Club has a wall surrounding its property, but just beyond the wall, a small piece of land is occupied by some residents of Kibera. The structures on this land will be demolished when the road passes. The group of structure owners have now created a third court case, where they are demanding advanced title claims. In Kenya, if you squat someone’s land for over ten years without any complaints or demands to leave, you have the right to demand the land from the private owner. This is what a group of structure owners are doing. This group is exclusively made up of structure owners (those that own homes or businesses) that are on the tiny portion of land beyond the wall of the golf club.

A third movement that took form emanates from the Nubian community. The Nubians are historic settlers of Kibera, having been placed there by the British colonial rule. The Nubian community led a court case against KURA, but has opted to not pursue the matter after the courts had instructed KURA to settle the dispute in private (KURA, Interview, 2018). This case is exclusively made up of Nubians, yet the inner structures of their organization are not known. Their organization is not involved with outside parties and holds lose ties to the other cases present in Kibera.

The last major resistance movement comes from two main leaders, Ben Ooko and Brian Inganga. Ben Ooko is the head of a peace project, Amani Kibera, which is a youth-led CBO that promotes peace building projects through cultural, educational and sport activities. Whilst Brian Ignanga is a freelance photo journalist who runs a local CBO, Change Mtaani. Their aim is to propose an alternative movement in response to the perceived lack of inclusivity from the three existing cases outlined above (Ooko and Inganga, Interviews, 2018). Their organization was built on their existing networks in the community and was destined to be open to all. Their peaks of activity was in the years 2016-17 when they organized talks with the leaders of the other three movements whilst inviting the community at large to join them. The way they mobilized these community members was by inviting the Member of Parliament for Kibera and organizing talks with Kenya National Human Rights Commission (KNHRC), Kituo Cha Sheria and Amnesty

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33 A legal institute that helps the urban poor on land matters.
International. These third parties were invited with three aims. The first, to be a mediating force between the three existing court cases, the second, to provide logistical and expert assistance and the third to bring more publicity and awareness to the case. Today their momentum has slowed down a bit, with the third parties no longer involved.

3.2 Timeline of the resistance in Kibera:
As mentioned, it has been 60 years that the road has been planned, with the final go ahead coming 2 years ago. This led to the rapid mobilization of the inhabitants of the inhabitants of Kibera. Peter and his team subsequently mobilized themselves later in 2016, as did the Nubian case. Later in the year 2016, KURA hired young “thugs” to come and place markers and red crosses to demarcate the road.

![Figure 10: A yellow marker placed in the Amani Kibera compound](image)

This led to violent clashes, especially between those “thugs” and a local middle school in Kichingio, where the school children successfully repelled the thugs from placing the marker and the red crosses on their school. In late 2016 the Egesa case made efforts to cooperate with the Nubian community to create a joint case. As will be explained in more detail later, these talks fell through, and the Nubians pursued their own agenda.
2017 was when Brian and Ben started becoming more active members in community wide negotiations after noticing the gradual splintering of the community. It was during this year where numerous attempts were made to bring in parties with more resources and legal expertise. In late 2017, the negotiations with KNHRC, Kituo Cha Sheria and Amnesty fell through. It was also around this time that the third case of advanced title claims materialized. In 2018 some reconciliatory attempts were made between Ben Brian and Peter but with little fruits. Currently there are only the Egesa and advanced title claims cases going on. The latest on the Egesa case is that they have until the 24\textsuperscript{th} of April to complete the valuation of their properties, but with the intent remaining unclear.

3.3 Resisters’ relation to participatory bodies
The lack of a participatory body makes this section a bit more redundant. Although, there minimal relations between the KURA and the affected community, they are tainted by general animosity. KURA has invited the leading members of the court cases to its offices, along with Amnesty and KNHRC. There was a period in which frequent, so called open meetings were held by KURA in Kibera. However, these meetings were farces, filled with people from outside the affected communities (Interview, Inganga, 2018). Moreover, Brian Inganga would often try and attempt to attend those meetings, as a concerned affected resident, but they would change location last minute. The last time he tried to attend, he was physically thrown out of the hall where they were holding the meeting (Interview, Inganga, 2018).

There is also little place for dialogue, as the resisters are branded as being anti-development, or putting forth petty arguments to the disadvantage of the community at large. This puts resisters in difficult situations, where they are victimized by renouncing the resiliency discourse of being “good subjects”. They chose not to be the citizens that “survive and thrive in any situation” (Bracke, 62). Due to their stance against so called “development” it makes it difficult for resistance groups to hold productive discussions with KURA or government.

3.4 The strategies used by resisters in Kibera
We have already discussed some of the divisions within the community, yet the strategies employed by each resistant group will shine more light on why the divisions occurred. A group the strategies and the resulting splintering of the community is the choice between efficiency and effectiveness.
The best way to describe the juxtaposition between efficiency and effectiveness is the Nubian case. The historic settlers of Kibera had been in negotiations with the Egesa petitioners to create a single court case. After a few months of negotiation, the former group decided to part ways and create a case of their own feeling that by mobilizing their ancestral claims to the land would lead to a better individual result. It was at this moment where Peter Nyagesera felt betrayed and his team of petitioners became more private in their dealings, refusing to share their information concerning the road (Interview, Nyagesera, 2018). The latest information concerning the case of the Nubians was that they had negotiated in private with KURA and the government to settle the case. In 2017, president Uhuru Kenyatta had issued a title deed of 288 acres of land in Kibera for the Nubian community (Nairobi News). Reportedly, the Nubian community was presented with two options: to accept the title deed and allow a portion of it to go to the road project, or otherwise no title deed and the road will still go through. The choice between efficiency and effectiveness is to choose between a case that will be easy to govern and coordinate, or to have an effective outcome, one that is to the benefit of a majority of residents.

In reaction to the “betrayal” of the Nubians, the Egesa petitioners have adopted a similar strategy of efficiency. They no longer delegate with the community at large and prefer to work via the leading representatives as mentioned above: structure owners, FBO leaders etc. These community leaders are able to pay for the costs of the court cases, meaning that the Egesa petitioners have been able to pool together a considerable amount of resources. If we look at how they are carrying out the valuation of their properties, FBO leaders, CBO leaders and structure owners are each valuing the properties of their “constituents”, and if you are not represented, you have to pay individually for your valuation fees. It means that your “average” inhabitant is no longer directly represented in the Egesa case, but through a patron. Therefore, these individuals are not able to participate in the decision making of their own futures. It is a questionable practice, but considering the existing community divisions and previous betrayal, there are good reasons for the Egesa petitioners to work with community members they know closely and trust. A more extreme example of such a modus operandi is the structure owner case mentioned above, operating solely with a handful of members. In similar vein, Zérah demonstrates how neighborhood associations that were comprised of middle class members were able to successfully resist a road extension project due to their connections and access to sound legal advice (865-6).
Egesa has repeatedly said that they only have one aim for the court case, the redirection of the road to its original path. Their struggles in court have taken over two years, with no ruling as of yet. In their bid to redirect the road, the petitioners have found documents of prior plans strengthening their claim that there is behind the scenes lobbying based on patron-client ties. Apart from the court case, Egesa has no other fronts on which it is resisting the road.

In contrast, Ben and Brian’s strategies revolve mainly around community dialoguing and consensus creation. As mentioned, key to this process is the inclusion of external parties as facilitators. The reason Ben and Brian’s project didn’t work was because Peter felt that Amnesty was not keen on supporting the Egesa case the way they wanted, and that Amnesty was too invested in the aiding the Nubians (Interview, Nyagesera, 2018). The involvement of third parties also reveals the difficulties of using a visible spokesperson (in this case, amnesty). There are valid reasons to be wary of the spokesperson and its capacity to translate and diffuse the message “without body” (Mouchard, 2010). The vision shared by Brian and Ben demands a lot of effort and time. Faced with such tough opposition, these are two resources that many community members feel they do not have. And as we have seen with participation, it is also very difficult to work around the existing community level inequalities. Nonetheless, without the endeavors of Ben and Brian, many residents of Kichingio, Mashimoni and Lindi feel they would never have been involved, or made to feel concerned by what was facing them (Interview, Ochieng, 2018). Besides the highly organized and relatively resource rich cases of Egesa, the structure owners and the Nubians, the average inhabitants do not mobilize themselves to a great extent. The peak of their involvement was through the help of Ben and Brian. Now that the talks have stalled, the majority of the inhabitants’ form of resistance is limited to slandering about the road project, and at times removing markers or red crosses from their walls.

Unlike Korogocho and Huruma, this form of resistance is not as clearly divided between tenants and structure owners. In fact, despite the under representation of tenants in the Egesa and structure owner court case, tenants will still stand to win if Egesa and the structure owners manage to stop the road from going through their homes. In the likely event that KURA will not offer compensation for the demolishing of their homes, structure owners are the main defenders of the tenants, even if they are doing it out of self-interest.

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34 Sans corps: without body, meaning without an organized institution in charge of the expression of discontent or movement it is voicing.
Additionally, if there is to be compensation handed out by KURA, it will most likely be given to the structure owners. Regardless, there is a patron-client aspect at play where most tenants rely on their local elites to mobilize on their behalf. The story of the resistance struggle in Kibera is one of resource weak (potential) resisters that rely on local resource rich mobilizing agents, who are often “sociologically different” than their beneficiaries (Mouchard, 2010).

4. Concluding remarks
There is a very real need for resistance to exist and to offer confrontation that would otherwise be nonexistent in participatory bodies. Our takeaways from chapter 2 and 3 are that there are very serious systemic issues within slum upgrading: unaccountable leaders, lack of transparency especially with the financial aspects of slum upgrading, participatory bodies being forms of institutional clientelism, unfair distribution of land and savings, little or no consideration for tenants and many more. In the two cases of slum upgrading where participatory bodies are present, participation serves more as a way to shut down debate. Every time concerns are brought to the institutional level, be it Muungano or KENSUP, the concerned inhabitant is told that they should resolve it with their “elected” representative and that little can be done. This notion is also displayed in Rigon’s work where implementing organizations have little will to correct imperfections in the slum upgrading process (2017). It therefore demonstrates that the cases studies chosen, follow a global model of local elite capture and the technocratization of participatory decision making (De Wit and Berner 2009; Dill 2009; Swyngedouw 2009). In the case of the Kibera-Langata roads project, dealing with KURA is not much different. Bearing this in mind, the main purpose of resistance is that at the very least it offers serious platforms of debate, even if resistance is led in a highly divided manner. What we have seen from chapter three is that resistance, especially considering the numerous shapes and forms it embodies, offers the ability to shed light on the inner trappings of slum upgrading.
Chapter 4: Evaluating Resistance

Chapter three has shown that it is extremely difficult to have a singular notion of resistance in informal settlements. The simple fact that many people find themselves excluded from slum upgrading projects, does not translate to a unified vision on how and with what means they can challenge the implementing structures. In turn, the objectives and results of resistance are highly subjective, depending on the aims of different groups and “categories” of slum-dwellers. Neither are there universal criteria by which we can evaluate resistance. In most simple terms this chapter will look at how resistance provides for three main outcomes in which some, or all community members can find refuge. The three outcomes are, buying time, pushing for (micro) changes in the project, and democratizing participation. The literature review has demonstrated that participation has many undemocratic elements embedded in it. Resistance to participatory slum upgrading is essential, as it allows for institutions to receive more information from bottom-up channels. In fact, the literature and primary resources has demonstrated the opposite, where only certain (acceptable) voice are amplified (Dill 2009; Swyngedouw 2005; Zérah 2009). The three categories of outcomes mentioned will be used to answer the research question, whether resistance is a more effective reconciliatory tool between bottom up and top-down implementation strategies. Drawing on what has been said in chapter 3, chapter 4 will also consider the inner divisions and struggles of resistance when assessing its outcomes, leading to a better understanding as to whether resistance is a more global representation of local level desires in urban redevelopment.

1. Resistance and the buying of time:
Bayat presents the “informal person” as a having little capacity to engage in collective action and only doing so in the face of state repression (1997). The primary reason is that the ‘informal person’ has little time to engage in strategizing collective shared actions with people in similar conditions. While Bayat discusses informal vendors and economic agents, his work can be applied to the case of slum-dwellers at large, as many of the people encountered engage in “informal” work. What has been observed is that their time spent on domestic affairs is intertwined with their forms of employment. In consequence, there is weariness to engage in “formal procedures, governing their time, obligations and commitments” also explaining in part the reluctance to engage in participatory bodies (Bayat, 59). What this report would like propose in counterpart is that, despite the absence of time, there are forms of (micro) resistance imbedded in the hidden transcript that can
serve to stall projects, which in some cases allow formations of collective action. Moreover, the stalling of the project is a factor which will define whether resistance can offer solutions to a wider range of inhabitants than participation.

The area where the buying of time is most prevalent is in Huruma. As explained in chapter 3, there have been a series of conflicts in the village level Muungano structures. These disputes are further fueled by a collective frustration on behalf of the Muungano leaders towards the inhabitants of their villages (Mbuthia, Interview, 2018). In the esteem of Mbuthia, it is very difficult to govern a slum upgrading project when there are the (perceived) majority people not contributing to it with their time and financial resources. Therefore, there is very little visible impact of the slum upgrading in Ghetto village, as well as Redeemed. With the addition of another implementing institution, KISIP, there are further complications arising which gives the community even more time to adopt different future strategies, either personally or collectively. Despite prevalent stalling through tactics mentioned in chapter 3: not attending meetings, refusing to save and selling of plots, the time created does not materialize in collective action. In this Huruma, Bayat’s thesis holds to a certain extent. What I would add, is that through individual shared strategies, the inhabitants of Huruma are rejecting a policy of resiliency, choosing to dictate their own future, how they want to live and in what conditions, despite it being very difficult to resist resiliency (Bracke 2016). Concomitantly, I propose that another element is added when conceiving collective action. Despite there being no formal organization or formation of common strategy there are shared outcomes from which a large majority of inhabitants can benefit from. Much of the resistance is led by “weaker” structure owners and tenants. Yet it is important to remember that structure owners have a larger impact when resisting, as the slum upgrading program is designed for them. Nonetheless, the collective buying of time has to be seen as an implicit solidarity strategy. It is a non-discriminatory collective good, allowing tenants and structure owners alike to come up with plans for the future. Our last consideration is that a collective form of resistance could yet materialize with the time bought in Huruma. It would perhaps require the presence of a community mobilizer from different social background (Mouchard, 2010). In the case of Huruma, time buying strategies have in a sense allowed for a better reconciliatory mechanism between bottom-up and top-down desires. If it were not for the “foot dragging” tactics of certain inhabitants, the project might be further ahead, but with many more victims as well. Ergo, at the very least, it has allowed for those left out to in part imagine and start to implement their
desired alternative futures\textsuperscript{35}, which would have not been possible if the project had run without hinderances.

I have previously shown that highly divisive trends are at play in Kibera, with the resistance based on class and ethnic lines. The use of divisive strategies also incurs costs on the larger community. The court case led by the Nubian community is one such example, whereby their decision to adapt to the demands of the government has meant that they have not offered the community with the collective good of time. Despite the Nubians rejecting the road, such survival strategies explained in Bourbeau and Ryan’s paper do result in externalities that other parties have to account for. The Egesa resistance movement, despite being sectarian, has had the positive externality of buying time. KURA officially expects its road to be done in a year and a half, (KURA, Interview, 2018). With the current court case, the timeline will be seriously hampered. Many other members of the community acknowledge this benefit. There have been many personal attacks on Peter for the way he has led his court case\textsuperscript{36}. But Ben actually recognizes the need to assist Peter and encourage the community at large to see the Egesa petition as complementary to their struggles (Ooko, Interview, 2018). It is a matter of putting aside questions of procedure in favor of practicality. Looking at Kibera, and the Egesa court case, a single movement of organized resisters has bought a lot of time for the rest of the community. There are initial signs that there is a willingness to create alternative court cases or a community wide effort. Furthermore, there are plans in the process to organize peaceful demonstrations and to return to the offices of the KNHRC to see how they can

\textsuperscript{35} Some have sold their plots, others have carried out improvements to their structures in defiance of the slum upgrading. As for tenants they have more time to save for moving elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{36} People feeling excluded from Peter’s inner circles.
help (Ooko and Inganga, Interviews, 2018). Relative to Huruma, the effects of project stalling has had more democratic consequences, with greater potential for benefiting larger numbers of people. At the time this report was written, there are no conclusive results of community wide movements. Despite the attempts of Brian and Ben to create a singular movement, the benefits of the Egesa case will still have benefits for a large group of individuals. Dennis Ochieng, a tenant from Lindi village has a water selling business outside the area to be destroyed. With the money from his business he was able to save enough to start renting a new room outside the affected area, but not too far either from his workplace (Ochieng, Interview, 2018). This is but one example amongst others who are able to individually put in place alternative future plans. Yet the hope is, that in Kibera the strong presence of elites willing to mount movements, a more inclusive resistance movement can materialize.

In Korogocho, the distribution of individual land titles has meant that resistance has been less able to stall the project. Efforts to implement a community land title have proved quite difficult and individual land titles means that structure owners face less obstruction to carry out their work. The issues that did arise with land titling have been able to be contained by the RC and as will be discussed later, many residents resolve their issues in private. Thus the RC services to enforce a state of exception within participatory bodies, allowing for the execution of a smooth upgrading project (Swyngedouw 2009; Rigon 2017). The years of 2014 and 2015 did provide a respite for many of the inhabitants of Korogocho, when Uncle and his colleagues managed to accumulate voices of dissent directed at the RC with great effect. The RC had come to realize that there was a lot of opposition to the project and the manner in which they carried it out. Subsequently they were forced to remain inactive during this period (Walainaina, Interview, 2018). At the individual scale, there are very few possibilities for an individual to effectively resist the project and thus help the community at large. There are some stories of individuals having resisted access roads from being placed, only to be forcibly removed in the late hours of the night (Walainania, Interview, 2018). As mentioned in chapter three, there is also little desire for individual resistance because it cannot as easily be done in a hidden manner, it requires the individual to become visible. From the existing literature on Korogocho slum upgrading and the accounts of the inhabitants on the ground, there is a very threatening and effective “frontier of intimidation” established by the RC, leading to little possible action for the inhabitants of Korogocho, especially the tenants (Scott 1990, 193). Looking beyond resistance, there has been one factor that has
stalled the project for the inhabitants of Korogocho, which is the lack of financial resources including the need for KENSUP to find new sources of income (KSUP, Interview, 2018).

Despite there being cases of intentional project stalling in Huruma, Kibera and Korogocho, the tools utilized to stall these projects are very diverse. Chapter two identified different ways in which implementation of the slum upgrading projects are done in. This has repercussions on how one can resist, with resisters in Huruma having the luxury of being far more invisible than in Kibera or Korogocho. Rigon has demonstrated how community land titles are a way to restrict gentrification. In turn, this research might have uncovered another way in which community land titles and communal savings groups slow down project implementation and to a certain extent, allow for safer zones of resistance. The comparison of the three case studies have shown that individual resistance has more consequences and is more likely to take place in Huruma than in the other two cases of slum upgrading. Regardless, in all three cases, the buying of time has allowed for greater inclusion in the slum upgrading project. If there was no inclusion in the actual decision making, the buying of time has included people by allowing them to create alternative strategies, for structure owners and tenants alike. Project stalling also means that more frequent interaction occurs between resisters and participants, with local Muungano members going to hold talks with resisters (Mbuthia, Interview, 2018). As will be discussed later, project stalling is the first visible effect of resistance towards slum upgrading. Subsequently, it gives opportunities for other forms of resistance to arise. In conclusion, the buying of time is already in part a reconciliatory mechanism between top down and bottom up implementation strategies as it allows for greater inclusion, reflective time for both parties and formation of alternative strategies for most stakeholders.

2. Redistributing project benefits
Bayat accurately describes the perceived “necessity” for many ordinary people to “quietly encroach” in order to survive (1997). Survival strategies in this sense are not adaptive strategies, but rather the obtaining of services of “project wealth” out of non-ideological direct action (Ballard 2014). Development has secondary, undirect benefits when direct action is taken by those excluded from the project. Despite much of the literature discussing encroachment being focused on informal traders/employees, Ballard translates that link from the informal economy to general patterns of resistance led by victims and outcasts of development. In turn, the encroaching of development projects is another form of redistribution, just that it is led by direct action. This action that is undertakable, largely due to the time acquired by forms of resistance mentioned in section 1 of this chapter. this
next section will look at how those excluded from slum upgrading can mobilize themselves to become the next beneficiaries through resistance tactics. In the cases encountered, there are few compromises made to ensure their inclusion, due to the fact that compromising would have not alleviated their position. Nonetheless, this section will largely be focused on structure owners, as this form of resistance was most accessible to them. We have discussed that most of the tenants are not included in the logic of slum upgrading, especially in the case of Korogocho. Thus, tenants are not considered as active resisters, and indirectly and minimally benefit from the resistance led by structure owners. In the case of redistribution, or micro changes, it is uncertain whether tenants stand to win as much as with time buying. Resistance and the distribution of project benefits challenge the notion whether resistance can be reconciliatory or not.

When encroaching, or redistributing the benefits of project implementation through resistance, it is important not to hold high expectations. There is little sustained organized resistance in Korogocho and Huruma, whilst the organized resistance in Kibera is highly divided making it easy for government to deal with resistance groups individually leading to subjective urbanism (Doshi 2013). The most frequent form of redistribution of project benefits is compensation, and the most obvious case of this is the Kibera roads project. The Nubian community of Kibera is the first group to have concluded a form of compensation. Their private discussions with government and KURA has led to official recognition of their land. Thus, they were able to stall the project and mobilize their ancestral ties to the land successfully. Isolating the Nubian community on its own, the result obtained is highly desirable, meaning that only a few members of their community have suffered for a greater purpose in obtaining a formal land title, a rarity in informal settlements. The consequences on the rest of Kibera are grave, the government can now focus its energies on the remaining two cases. Furthermore, this sets a precedent in the Kibera-Langata road project. KURA and the government can incite other court cases to negotiate in private. As a result, only those well-organized with connections to government can successfully fight for their compensation or government support (De Wit & Berner 2009). The Nubian land deal also demystifies resolute resistance (introduced in the literature review). In her text on the politics of eviction, Doshi explains how NGOs resisting eviction engage in compromising strategies to obtain the best possible result for their constituents. The implications are that slum clearance and resettlement exacerbate inequalities and that governments are only forced to recon with those successful enough to enter in dialogue with it (Doshi 862). What we see in Kibera today is similar to the
Mumbai case Doshi describes. It is therefore that Peter and the Egesa petitioners felt betrayed by the Nubians after assisting them with documents and maps. The government has managed to splinter a part of the community in accepting the road project. The precedent means that the Egesa petitioners now will find it extremely hard to push through their original case of relocating the road. They too will be forced into playing a similar game as the Nubians, which begs the question so many people in Kibera ask today, why have the Egesa petitioners valued their properties? The risk for Kiberans is that the redistribution of goods that the road project has to offer will become a domino game. It will be highly unlikely that the Nubians remain an exception to the adaptation strategies the state has pushed resisters into. In turn, the Kibera resistance re-enforces the need to dichotomize resistance and resilience. In its panning out of large scale urban projects, the state enforces discretionary roles of management, privileging appointments based on connections and close ties (Swyngedouw et al, 218). What ensues is the proliferation of two classes; civil society that are able to come to terms with government (or implementers) and those unable to (Swyngedouw et al, 218). Peter and his team will be compelled to follow suit by the aforementioned logics. Thus, resistance finds it hard to repel the neoliberal demand of “bouncing back”. Sarah Bracke’s recommendation to resist resilience becomes all the more important, as individual units will be more enticed into such compromising strategies, rather than collectives. However, if this report has done what it intended to do, it is nearly impossible to resist on a community wide basis.

The unequal distribution of land by RC members has equally given rise to individual forms of resistance and distribution of project benefits. Residents of Korogocho A spontaneously demonstrated in front of the RC office when surveyors came, demanding more accountability. Nonetheless, most of the land matters get discussed in private. An elderly lady in Githathuru village, who runs a local school was given a plot for her home and a plot for her school. Giving one plot for her school would have seriously reduced her capacity to school the local children. She refused to be interviewed because she did not want to relive those difficult times. The RC had told her that 2 plots for her school would not have been possible. In response, the elderly lady contacted Koch FM and started making a lot of noise, by portraying her school as a collective amenity necessary for her village (Walainaina, Interview, 2018). Similar land issue struggles happen throughout Korogocho. Yet most of the disputes are settled one on one. As discussed, many of the single structure owners have to share plots with others. These structure owners often go to the RC to understand why they have been placed as they are. Yet few are able to
change matters. Some are even told that because they are connected in some way to the RC they only have to share their plot with three others instead of 5 others, and that they should consider themselves fortunate (Ndungu, Interview, 2018). Redistributing the benefits of slum upgrading in Korogocho is about one’s ties to the RC. Korogocho reveals that “successful” implementation of slum upgrading projects is not only a case of patronage ties between participatory bodies and local government, as Zérah mentions, but also between local inhabitants and participatory bodies. The redistribution of project welfare in Korogocho has a different way of manifesting itself than in Kibera, yet is only an option when the individual is well connected.

Figure 12: Plots to be Demolished in Korogocho

In the case of tenants, there is very little capacity for them to demand project benefits, as they are already considered to benefit when their structure owners will build “better” housing for them (KSUP, Interview, 2018). Moreover, there are no cases of the redistribution of project benefits on a collective level, where one’s resistance was intended to benefit a greater amount of people than his or herself. The only known answer why this does not occur is due to the intimidation tactics of the RC and few people wanting to get involved in their neighbor’s business.
Distributing project benefits in Huruma is not as common as in the other two case studies. An indirect way project benefits get redistributed is through project rejection. There are several cases where structure owners have sold their plots to private investors. This can be considered project redistribution as it means the person who has sold the plot ensures they receive tangible benefits from the selling of that plot, instead of risking saving money only to find there is no more land available in his or her village. Furthermore, the rejection of the project, or in other words, minor sabotaging of the project, is also a way for slum-dwellers of lower status to mitigate appropriation (Scott 1990).

Understanding the redistribution of project goods, one comes to realize the darker side of resistance. There are very few cases of altruism where resistance has led to the intended benefit of a large collective inhabitant. When stating this, it is also important to relativize with the fact that there are few cases of sustained collective resistance in Korogocho and Huruma. Secondly, the literature review has demonstrated that the enigma of community is hard to mobilize, with many people perceiving community as spaces ridden with individualism and personal agendas (Herbert 2005). Individuality and personal agendas are fueled by multiple identities, meaning “solidarity cannot be taken for granted and reciprocal relations and collective action in a slum occur within subgroups more often than at the level of the ‘community’” (De Wit & Berner, 943). This “natural state of affairs” plays at the hand of government. The government is able to capitalize on the divisions of the proletariat, thus molding the city to its liking (Doshi 2013). Segment 2 shows that resistance anchored in redistribution is rarely aimed at the common ‘communitarian’ good, but the ensuring of one’s own survival. Bourbeau and Ryan’s argument is that resilience is a necessary component to sustain a certain level of material wellbeing in order to be able to continue resisting. While I do not want to directly challenge their thesis, it certainly does not hold in the case of resisting slum upgrading. Resistance with the aim of redistribution has a very individual or sectarian take to it. Resistance, from my point of view, stems from reacting to perceived injustices. Consequently, if the outcomes of one’s resistance is to recreate other injustices, especially when they disadvantage their close neighbors, then one has to question whether such tactics fall under resistance. On the other hand, it is a nearly insurmountable task that resisters face. The literature on community should serve as a counter-balance when evaluating the altruism of resistance. The two excerpts by De Wit & Berner and Herbert show that the flaws of community (thus the flaws of resistance) also help play into the hands of
governmental resiliency projects. I would therefore not go as far to isolate the blame solely on the individuals or collectives demanding project benefits.

3. Resistance: open defiance and democratizing slum upgrading

Resistance to slum upgrading happens both visibly and invisibly. Regardless, community members and institutions know it exists and are confronted with its effects. Sections 1 and 2 of chapter 4 demonstrate that resistance is a repeated action, and is difficult to harness under one movement or figure. The repeated practice of resistance is what gives it such an important political and material effect (Scott 1990, 192). Despite acknowledging that resistance can be very sectarian, the more “invisible” side of resistance has benefits to all, as it is able to buy time and allow for the formation of alternative strategies collectively or individually (see section 1 of chapter 4). Similarly, Scott also describes that resistance has grave political consequences for those in power. While Scott describes the equilibrium between resistance and state repression as mutual incomprehension, often leading to violent punishment, the context of resisting slum upgrading is one where resistance aims at opening up debate surrounding the project. This is not to minimize the effect of violent occurrences that punctuate and disrupt the life of resisters. Instead, the act of resistance has unpunished elements, as described in Domination and the Art of Resistance, whilst also being a force that can lead to changing ideas on slum upgrading.

The first such force is the many instances of squatting. Besides the large groups of people that refuse to save in Huruma, many people who live in newly built structures refuse to pay their “rent”[^37]. Their rent is collected by the treasurer of the village savings group, yet there are no receipts given when you save and no proper trace of where the money goes to, furthermore, the savings group chairman is never to be found (Inhabitant of Huruma 2, Interview, 2018). As a result, many inhabitants of Mahera choose to squat the houses they received, which would otherwise be too expensive for many to live in (Inhabitant of Huruma 2, Interview, 2018). Each village of Huruma is faced with several similar systematic issues. First and foremost, not paying rent and refusing to save is tolerated by the local chairman[^38], whilst there is little way for chairmen and women to enforce the inhabitants to save. Moreover, the refusal to save and squatting is not only a time buying strategy but also a way for discontentment to be circulated up the chain. It

[^37]: Those who have houses have to repay their loans borrowed from AMT, in the case of the women interviewed, it was 3000 per month.

[^38]: The inhabitant interviewed had not paid for three years.
would be untrue to state that there is a good level of understanding between those running the Muungano projects and those resisting. But symbolically there is value in rendering people aware of discontent through resisting. There are also further repercussions, as the government is aware of the project failures in Huruma, making it difficult for villages to negotiate for community land titles with the NCC (Mbuthia, Interview, 2018). Therefore, at the Muungano administrative level and the City County level, there is a clear understanding that on the ground level there are serious failures. Looking back at the original question of this report, resistance yet again is a more effective way to channel discontent and project failures than participatory bodies. Once more, the requirements for a CBO or participatory bodies to function according to government or International NGO standards are very high and out of reach for most citizens (Dill, 737). In Huruma, individual resistance or a set of collective actions has a lot of symbolic and intangible effect, as it is the means of communication for the more marginalized communities.

**Figure 13:** A completed street in Mahera, facing slums.

Resistance also offers the individual a support system that action is a possible option when faced with repression from the local elite. Having said this, action is perhaps an option available in the imaginary of the small structure owner and not the tenant. As has been thoroughly discussed, there have been several attempts at understanding more
about the inner workings of the RC in Korogocho. Through public debates, radio shows and even private discussions, pressure has been put to understand why elected RC members do not step down, or how they distribute plots. These questions were able to circulate around Korogocho largely due to the sustained pressure in 2014-2015. The noise created brought the attention of KENSUP, yet no action was taken, with KENSUP telling the inhabitants to sort it out amongst themselves (Ndungu, Interview, 2018). Resistance can only go so far, especially if it is coming from the weaker members of society. Resistance is also a tool that is used to bring to attention the short comings of projects or programs, with the ultimate objective of forcing change from below. Purely results based, the Korogocho resisters did not attain their objectives due to the lack of governmental response. Neither can resisters change the system of participation on the ground, due to the aforementioned effective “frontier of intimidation” set up by the RC. The modus operandi of networked associations are unclear and it is unsure how the external accountability of participatory groups works (Swyngedouw, 1999). This is further enabled by “fuzzy institutional arrangements, ill defined responsibilities and ambiguous political objectives” between state and networks (Swyngedouw, 1999). There are direct similarities between the theory presented by Swyngedouw and the KSUP. Consequently, capacities of resistance to champion democratic proceedings in participatory slum upgrading are minimal if they are met with such a powerful collusion of government and participatory bodies. Yet again, one cannot neglect that in Korogocho there are also questionable governance practices within resistance groups. Public meetings were held openly and allowed all residents to join. But when it comes to the rights of tenants however, there is not much to be heard or found when speaking to the leaders and members of resistance movements. Similar to section 2 of this chapter, resisters find it difficult to go beyond the interests of the members of a resistance body. The way project benefits were redistributed was unequal, as is the manner in which discursive agendas and manifestation of rights are mobilized when affronting participatory body members. The common set of values found in communities that DeFilippis discusses is not often found in the cases studied, giving a more nuanced and divided reading of community. Yet, there is still value in pushing the door ajar rather than leaving it completely closed from criticism or resident concern.

A similar dynamic is present in the resistance led by Kiberans against the road project. There are highly organized yet exclusive resistance groups, but these resistance groups do force democratic procedures. If it weren’t for the efforts of the Egesa
petitioners, most of the inhabitants of Kibera would not have known about the lack of transparency from the behalf of government, and the 3 preceding road plans. Additionally, the resistance leaders also were there to denonce and interrupt the false “consultative” meetings KURA would hold frequently in different areas of Kibera. It is only the efforts of Brian and Ben that led to the democratization of the information gathered concerning the road project. More so, their efforts were noble in character, but again did not lead to the successful establishment of an inclusive resistance group able to disseminate information concerning the road project far and wide.

The third outcome of resistance is an essential one. To some extent, resistance is able to counter the closed, sterile and technocratic logics of participation. Through its revolted nature, resistance forces practitioners to engage with voices of dissent that lead to the spreading of information and in the very rare cases, minor changes in the project. In its pursuit for greater democracy, resisters are often faced with the lack of institutional support that is key to helping them persevere as we have seen in Korogocho. Many times, resisters are met with resiliency tainted discourse, that those refusing the project are not allowing the community to advance as a whole (Ooko, Ndungu, KURA, Interviews, 2018). In turn, government does not want to be affiliated with the more oppositional forms of community, “involving protests and other forms of disruptive repertoires” (Defilippis et al, 126). As a result, it is difficult for resistance groups to maintain an aggressive stance towards government in fear of being further excluded or missing out on project benefits (Swyngedouw et al 2002; Doshi 2013). But, as we have seen, the manner in which resistance tries to obtain more inclusion and debate surrounding slum upgrading, is sometimes undemocratic or exclusive in itself, recreating other injustices. Returning to the literature, especially that on community, there is a need to question the idea that shared space and similar life conditions can create bounded communities (DeFilippis 2010). Resistance does bring about collective goods such as the buying of time leading to the ability for others to form alternative future plans. On the other hand, solidarity in communities are weak and in some cases resistance capitalizes on inequalities to the benefit of certain individuals or groups. Again, it is therefore that this report juxtaposes resistance and community as the latter serves as a balancing force when understanding the failures of resistance. Lastly, the capacity for resistance to wholly challenge the discourse and rationale of slum upgrading is in itself limited. It is mainly manifested in the fact that resistance does not adequately address some of the key exclusionary effects of slum upgrading, such as the lack of tenant inclusion.
4. Not everyone wants to resist

So far, this report has painted a simple painting: participatory body members and those resisting. In between these two groups, there exists a “silent majority”, those who agree with most of the slum upgrading project. Even within resistance groups, members frequently stated something along the lines of “I am not against the project as a whole, but…” This reveals that amongst some resisters, there is sometimes a “lack” of ideological grounding for which they resist. Better said, it is a more pragmatic view of slum upgrading that fuels their resistance. Nonetheless, there are those within resistance groups, especially leaders that try to mobilize a more universal ideological standpoint against slum upgrading. But on the whole, it is difficult to mobilize people against slum upgrading as it is something that happens quite slowly and with little visible effect. Many of the residents encountered, especially in Huruma and Korogocho have the feeling that slum upgrading won’t take effect, or is not something to retaliate against immediately. Many do not trust the local management and do not perceive them to be capable implementers. For those heavily involved with resistance, this apathy can sometimes be a source of frustration and a misguided opinion (Ndungu, Ooko, Chindi, Interviews, 2018).

Beyond the lack of “convinced” resisters, which again, is in part due to the undemocratic or exclusive strategies used by resistant groups, there is the challenge of engaging with those for or indifferent to the slum upgrading project. Many residents of Korogocho and Huruma welcome the arrival of a “development” project. In Korogocho A, there is a group of reformists that set themselves already indicates the pervasiveness of institutionalized developmental thinking. For many academics, self-help is a term describing the notion where the state has given up its tasks of development and pushed people in a new managerial way of thinking, only providing targets but no logistic and material support. Yet, this group was proud to affirm that they recently converted from being criminals to active community members that do not ask for governmental or NGO support. Their general discourse concerning the KSUP was quite mixed, with many of the same critiques thrown at the incompetent and autocratic RC (Mzinduko, Interview, 2018).

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39 This can be any social profile, during the field work, there were many tenants that believed in the promises of slum upgrading.

40 Reformists is the term they gave themselves, which means ex-criminals (mostly petty crime such as theft) that have given up crime to perform community services. An article that explains this phenomenon in Mathare https://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2014/mar/18/gangs-nairobi-mathare-slum-development.
Their overall belief for the project is that it will be good for the community, using quite a developmentalist discourse to back it up. As well as the roads that will improve accessibility in Korogocho, this group hoped that the provision of new housing will make it a more visited area of the city with more affluent residents of Nairobi wanting to do business here and bring opportunities (Mzinduko, Interview, 2018). The treasurer of their group had been placed in a plot with three others, but did believe that accessing a loan would not be too difficult or impose too many constraints (Mzinduko, Interview, 2018). There were tenants in their group, who had not been given plot titles. They did see their future in Korogocho however, and hoped that new business opportunities that would come with the slum upgrading program would compensate for the increased rent they would have to pay (Mzinduko, Interview, 2018).

A similar discourse is evident in Huruma as well. Although there is no account as detailed as the Mzinduko self-help group, many individuals did believe in some version of the slum upgrading. It perhaps explains why there is no universal ideological unity against slum upgrading, because there is little perception of slum upgrading as something that will inherently evict residents or gentrify the area. Andrea Rigon thoroughly demonstrates how community land titles are a tool that can help limit the effects of gentrification (2017). For
many single structure owners in Huruma, individual land titles would be the key solution, relieving them of the community pressure and land incursions made by collective forms of saving and building. Hence, in many respects, this is another community dynamic that limits the capacity of resistance to slum upgrading, whilst also helping to avoid categorizing resistance as the only other alternative for marginalized inhabitants.

5. Participatory structure versus non participatory structure

Compared to Huruma and Korogocho, the road project in Kibera is more generally considered as an incursion, even by those who do not reside in the affected areas. The residents are not convinced by the developmentalist discourse surrounding the road, allowing for more potential unity or common ground. Chapters 3 and 4 have implicitly discussed the differences in resistance techniques and outcomes between the three cases. This report’s aim is to comprehend if resistance can play a reconciliatory role to respond to the failures of participatory politics. In part, the answer lies in discerning differences in resistance, where participatory bodies are and are not present. The criteria that has been used to judge resistance has been whether it is inclusive, allows for democratic debate and if it creates any other inequalities in the process.

The visible difference between resistance in Kibera and that of Huruma and Korogocho, is that in Kibera, the elites of the affected areas are those that are leading the resistance movements. It clearly demonstrates the need for resource-rich mobilizers when facing tough institutional opposition (Mouchard 2010). However, these elites often lead their resistance on sectarian bases. Issues of class and ethnicity are the two major divisive factors in the way resistance is led in Kibera. In some respects, resistance in Kibera is as exclusive as participation in Huruma and Korogocho. This report has proposed a possible reason for this exclusivity. In my opinion, there is a similar rational between resistance in Kibera and participation in the other two case studies. This rational is that of the “dictatorship of efficiency”. Few authors who discuss participatory politics make direct reference to the dichotomy between efficiency and inclusivity. When participatory bodies (or resistance bodies like in the case of Kibera) have to use scarce resources effectively, they often struggle to be inclusive (Dill, 719). In the case of Kibera, the resisters have very limited resources, and they struggle to get access to key evidence that would help defend themselves. As explained, resistance bodies opt to align with powerful structure owners and community leaders to create efficient court cases. Participation is a group of citizens that has to directly engage with the “power hierarchies that control urban space” (Ghose, 64). It is not enough to just be a regular citizen to
engage with such technical exclusive contraption so urban politics, to do so a citizen must be “entrepreneurial and to develop the capacity to be an active agent in claiming their urban space” (Ghose, 64). This is the kind of citizen that is leading resistance against the slum upgrading of Kibera. In the absence of participatory bodies, it is the resistance groups that take up the role to negotiate with power, leading to the divided situation Kibera finds itself in today. To some extent, Uncle and his colleagues are of similar qualification. There are two biproducts that are produced from the type of resistance just described. The first is the common good of stalling and time bought. Secondly is the alternative resistance movement, that tries to promote inclusiveness. However, this form of resistance has a mountain to climb, as it needs to deal with the strong path dependency the other 3 resistance groups (the Nubians, Egesa, structure owners versus royal golf club) have formed.

Resistance as a response to participatory bodies does have its own problems as well, most notably the inability to consider tenants as part of the rightful beneficiaries of the slum upgrading. Considering the pervasive logic of tenant exclusion that is maintained by national institutions, it is quite a big ask to expect inhabitants of Huruma and Korogocho to reject the anti-tenant rationale of slum upgrading. Concomitantly, repelling the anti-tenant discourse of slum upgrading would be a first step in rejecting resilience (Bracke 2016). The second issue is that resistance is unable to form into a proper organized structure, which would enable communities to force more change in their respective projects. The complexities and heterogeneity of slum areas certainly plays a part in making it difficult to do so, but it begs the question whether it is an inherent character trait of inclusive resistance. The silver lining is that theoretically, any person in Huruma and Korogocho could be part of the resistance by performing the infrapolitical actions that are already enacted by so many. When comparing resistance in participatory and non-participatory settings, there are some similarities between resisters in Kibera and participatory bodies in Huruma and Korogocho. Whilst it would be unjust to equate them, they do produce the same effects, where splinter movements form out of the perceived injustices created by exclusive participatory bodies or resistance movements. This calls for further work on resistance studies especially in the era of participatory politics. What are the boundaries between resistance groups and participatory bodies and how can resistance groups form effective and inclusive movements to challenge participatory bodies, are but two of the questions that emanate from this research.
Chapter 5: Sustaining and Supporting Resistance

Working with resistance movements in slum areas necessitates a lot of caution on the behalf of international and local organizations, international social movements and NGOs. Primarily, many of the participants in resistance movements are very warry of outside interference or influence. The reason being, that outside organizations often make sweeping understandings and claims about the resistance struggles they are getting involved with. Secondly, there are always issues present with the body or organization that claims to speak on the behalf of affected people. Nonetheless, I do believe that it besides the harmful effects outside organizations can have on local social movements and resistance struggles, these same organizations are essential in amplifying voices and circulating messages of dissent in higher institutional echelons. Very simply, associations or international social movement coalitions can speak institutional language and have connections to powerful bodies, a characteristic that the local level resistance movements do not have.

Before outlining how NGOs or International social movements can help resistance movements like the ones found in Nairobi, I will first return to the case of Kibera. One of the main failures in the mounting of a unified resistance movement is that the agency with resources, Amnesty International, did not successfully manage to unify all resisting groups. Based on the interviews had with Peter Nyagesera and Ben Ooko, a conclusion that can be drawn is that Amnesty acted in an impartial manner, leading to the distrust of local factions of resistance groups. The underlying motif for Amnesty to have acted in an impartial way is because of their own subjective dealings with resistance groups. They felt that focusing on the Nubians with the support of Nyagesera and Ooko’s resistance groups would have been the better option. It is important to keep this example in mind as it demonstrates that often times NGOs feel that they have moral or final authority on the strategies resistance movements should follow. This moralizing attitude often is legitimized because it sees inner division within resistance groups as being “wrong” or “unjust/unfair”. Instead, this paper argues that acknowledging or respecting divisions will have to be concessions made in order to ensure resistance cohesion. It is not just the case of Kibera that justifies taking an understanding approach to inner divisions within communities and resistance movements, so does the Mumbai case outline by Sapana Doshi. This chapter will have a three stage discursive method on what I believe the best
approaches are to approaching and helping resistance groups fighting against participatory slum upgrading.

1. First, learn and understand
The best manner in which NGOs can avoid the problems described above is to learn about the local context and historic neighborhood level divisions, be it ethnic, gender, class, religious or spatial. The use of local level actors or brokers are essential to obtain this knowledge. Nevertheless, one has to be aware that aligning or employing a broker can also profile one as being more on a certain side than the other. The choice of broker or local CBO should be considered before entering the neighborhood and its local politics. What NGOs should look for when partnering with local organizations is a wholistic understanding of the neighborhood. Brokers that are not shy to bring NGOs or International social movement actors to different areas and to other CBOs that have differing views on slum upgrading. Furthermore, reading different sources of information such as local press, academic journals, keeping updated on social media can enable NGOs to better understand the reasons behind neighborhood divisions and how they are instrumentalized in slum upgrading projects.

As has been repeatedly mentioned, other NGOs or institutions that put in place participatory slum upgrading projects often institutionalize and rigidify pre-existing inequalities (read divisions) to benefit the efficiency of project implementation. A second analysis needs to be done by the organization willing to support resistance movements in the area. This analysis needs to uncover the work of local participatory slum upgrading and whether implementing agencies are unknowingly or purposefully employing such local level divisions to the advantage of project realization. Simply highlighting the way NGOs are employing disadvantages within the project will be useful for later stages when these realities can be brought to higher authorities.

Lastly, with the information in hand, it is then essential for NGOs or social movement actors to configure a plan of action. This plan of action is highly subjective based on the local context. Yet what needs to be taken into account is the extent to which divisions in the local neighborhood should be and can be acted upon. Chapter 4, section 2 shows that because of the highly inegalitarian nature of communities, redistribution also follows the same logic. Naturally this should be worked on by NGOs, yet this paper would also like to state that working to be a just, moral and fair authority will be equally counter-productive. More concretely, as an NGO working in the area, in order for one to successfully back the demands of resistance groups, you also have to sway the local elite
in favor of the demands of resistance groups. Again, it is for these two reasons understanding of local level tensions and divisions is paramount.

1. How NGOs institutionalize these inequalities in their slum upgrading projects
2. Being aware of these inequalities/divisions in order to tactfully counter them without alienating the local elite.

2. Organizing

This section is a bit more practical, and explains the logistical proceedings to create consensus amongst different groups negotiating slum upgrading. Along with the help of the International Alliance of Inhabitants, I have found that the most effective partners with which to work are local justice centers. The phenomenon of justice centers can shortly be resumed to CBOs that work especially on social issues in the area, with most of them carrying the words “justice center” in their name. The members that work within these organizations are both privileged in the economic and social sense. Many times, the leaders/executive body of such organizations are people slightly more economically emancipated, who spend a large portion of their time resolving neighborhood affairs from police violence to land issues. As a result, they are high profile members of their community who have an extensive network. Upon personal encounters with members of community justice centers, I found that they also had a good idea of which groups were in opposition to them and having a basic understanding of why. It is therefore also important to go and dialogue with opposition organizations that do not see eye to eye with community justice centers. Not only will it help the community perceive one as a less partisan actor, but it can also help empathizing with those outside community justice centers. Other organizational groups that should be dialogued with are youth groups and women business groups. These two categories of people are not as represented in justice centers, especially the later. They are also useful congregations of people to understand differing points of views.

Once contact has been established with the important CBOs of the area, it is then the role of the supporting NGO or social movement actors to federate these different collectivities. Based on the qualitative work done, I found that CBOs or community justice centers would often be reluctant to meet with other local community actors. When having a third party involved to federate community meetings, local CBOs and justice centers feel far more willing to participate. The addition of a third party mediator allows for CBOs to feel that there is a neutral space where ideological or different view points can be calmly discussed between differing groups. Moreover, it doesn’t simply help large CBOs to take
part in the process, but it also incites individuals in the community as well. Mr. Ochieng who worked and lived in Kibera was far more active as an individual, and would frequently attend meetings when Amnesty International was heavily involved in Kibera. According to him, there was also a certain sense that things were moving and concrete action was taking place when such prestigious International NGOs were partaking in meetings. As a result, NGOs active in resistance groups can therefore use such situations to their advantage and make sure that lower status community members are included in big gatherings.

When organizing action, I would advocated for a very mediator approach. The aim is to federate action, not to define it. The community members have a good enough idea of what is going on and what challenges they need to overcome, especially if there is a representative group present during meetings. As an NGO or International social movement organizing such meetings, it is important to be present and give guidance based on past experience, but not to judge what is good and what is bad action. The presence of such NGOs is more to help the community come up with a task plan. Because without your presence there would not be such wide spread participation. Put very simply, in my opinion, NGOs can help by concretely extracting community wide sufferings through mediation, and channeling this discontent further up.

3. Action
Once more, action does not mean for the involved NGO to dictate what discourse, plans or strategies the community will use. The single biggest action that the involved NGO can do, is to be the mediator on the community level, but also the mediator between community and Government. Returning to what Mr. Ochieng told me, the reason international NGO presence is welcomed, is because the community inhabitants recognize the power these players have with government, as they see International NGOs as far more powerful than CBOs.

In turn, the role of NGOs or International social movements is to present the discontent of the people to government. The challenge is to channel this discontent in a way that doesn't lose the original message of the people, but is still going to catch the attention of those in power. On a purely aesthetic level, this means creating reports, presentations or info-graphics of the said community problems that are easily understandable and legible for government officials who do not invest a lot of time in resolving community/local level matters. On a more theoretical level, the NGO is in charge
of making the infra-political, political. So the dissenting action, invisible to macro-scale actors, has to be rendered visible, but with a legible message behind it.

The last major challenge behind NGO action with resistance groups, is to counter the resilience and developmental discourse put forth by government and private sector actors. Most of the times, governments say that they do not have time or money to account for all inhabitants of the community in slum upgrading. Secondly, they are also pressured by strong agendas to reach targets and implement projects. Hence, for NGOs, there needs to be an effective profiling of why politicians and government members should invest more time and effort to create participatory slum upgrading more inclusive. Clear indications, such as making reference to politician’s popularity or showing how slum upgrading recreates other slums in the global south, should be tools used by NGOs to put pressure on politicians. These are clear cut messages, that are not ideological, but rather practical of nature. It is these kinds of messages that government or private sector workers will respond to, and not the vague ideological ones.
Conclusion

This report has shown resistance is an effective tool, or a tool to be considered when analyzing participatory slum upgrading. It is a reaction that spawns from the closed and undemocratic circles of participatory politics, or in some cases of exclusive resistance. To some extent, I would very humbly like to add a new dimension to Swyngedouw’s thesis of the “Janus face of governance”. Swyngedouw demonstrates how participation on the one hand democratizes by bringing communities directly in control of policies, yet that participation is fraught with issues of unrepresentativeness, accountability and legitimacy. In turn, resistance to participatory politics is another force to account for when understanding democratic procedures in the execution of policies. I have attempted to demonstrate the heterogenous, volatile, un-categorizable and sometimes exclusive face of resistance. Attributing these characteristics to the original question, resistance is thus a complementary force to participatory slum upgrading. To answer the question more precisely, despite the inner divisions and segregating tactics found in some resistance groups, resistance does prove to be a reconciliatory mechanism between top-down and bottom-up implementation procedures. The three main reasons are that it buys time for marginalized residents, it allows for the formation of alternative strategies and micro-changes in implementation procedure, and opens up debate on project implementation. Nevertheless, these goods that resistance provides are sometimes “handed out” subjectively and are intrinsically linked to local community power dynamics. Hence, it is important to consider resistance and community as intertwined forces, unable to understand one without the other.

My report was done in the context of a research internship for the International Alliance of Inhabitants (IAI). The IAI have been keen on continuing their involvement in the Korogocho Slum Upgrading Program (KSUP) after their initial contribution in the talks surrounding the debt swap program. This research has given them a glimpse of life today in the KSUP as well as the Huruma and Kibera projects. More importantly, it has also tried to give a preliminary anthology on what resistance looks like in certain informal settlements of Nairobi. The anthology of resistance along with its evaluation does not have the ambition to provide any prescriptive recommendations. As might seem quite obvious, tampering or controlling resistance from the outside or institutional stand point would simply lead to its dismantling. Instead, there are three take-aways this report would like to provide.
The first take-away is to re-iterate the notion that resistance to slum upgrading is very limited. The intent of using James Scott’s thesis on infrapolitics was to demonstrate that resistance is not always visible, can be highly unorganized and is usually acted out on the individual level. It is also for the safety and security of the individual that resistance is embedded in the “hidden transcript” due to the very powerful coalitions between participatory bodies and institutions. As a result, resistance to slum upgrading should be considered as a force with limited effects, and few aims or targets should be attached to resistance. Additionally, in the context of developmental projects where a lot of money is being injected in such communities, there is a fine line between resistance and adaptation strategies. Individuals who may resist, many times do so to become beneficiaries without “fighting” for the community at large. This is another factor that limits the outcomes of resistance and also would make it difficult for outside agencies to try and harness groups of individuals into a single movement.

The second take-away from this paper is that resistance in Korogocho, Kibera and Huruma is very fickle as an entity. People participating within resistance themselves have a hard to reconcile inner community divisions. Herbert, DeFilippis and Brent each demonstrate the difficulties of mobilizing community, and that it requires a strong understanding of local contexts. For outside organizations or social movements to intervene it is extremely important to work with local partners that have a history of resistance in the area. Furthermore, this report would like to dismantle the idea that resistance too has deep lying issues in itself. Those working with resistance movements have to be aware of these issues and cope with them. I would choose not to try to resolve issues of inequality, for obvious ethical reasons of not wanting to reinforce a moralizing discourse. Instead, Ben Ooko has given a better alternative of understanding exclusive resistance groups and trying to selectively use their desired characteristics and outcomes. The only prescription this conclusion will present is that if organizations are working with resistance movements, a tool to create more harmony might be the introduction of general more “ideological” concepts, especially those that already exist among certain members of the resistance movements.

Lastly, the report would like to encourage decision makers to observe resistance movements more thoroughly and consider their proposals as complementary to the

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41 This statement is not meant to be judgmental, as the author is in no position to criticize those employing tactics to better their lives. In the words of Sarah Bracke: rejecting resilience is refusing things that come at a very high price: work, shelter, aid or bailout loans (72).
functioning of participatory bodies. This last recommendation is perhaps quite a banal statement, as the original intent of resistance is to be heard by practitioners. Nonetheless, there is a need to consider these movements seriously especially if the institutions one works for, promote inclusivity and open participation. There is not much work done on resistance to slum upgrading, and even less so in the Kenyan context. Resistance could be a starting point for many institutions when carrying out evaluations of their projects or should be more heavily included and discussed when evaluating slum upgrading. Bringing resistance in as a criteria to evaluate slum upgrading would be a first step in resolving the systemic issues embedded in participation: lack of transparency, uncountability and exclusivity. The voices of dissent and frustration found in resistance movements can be a partial answer in regulating or redesigning participatory bodies.
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The opposition to projects for building infrastructure, modernization and other are often presented as a refusal of progress, the desire to preserve minor privileges or sterile claims of human rights, unable to produce urban and housing policies capable of addressing the housing and urban problems affecting more than 1.5 billion people worldwide. This research, carried out in collaboration between Sciences Politiques Paris, the Urban School, Governing the Large Metropolis and the International Alliance of Inhabitants, aimed to dig deep and understand what really happens behind the meta data, who the social and institutional protagonists are, the nature of the conflicts and what proposals they produce.

Starting with a specific and archetypal case, the struggles against evictions in Nairobi, the research go deeply into the roots of the arguments used to make an incomprehensible logical leap, that only the implemented policies of the New Urban Agenda are considered, expected and unchangeable.

On the one hand, we wanted to help the popular organizations that were sounding the alarm about new massive evictions in Nairobi to define an effective strategy for resistance actions. On the other hand, we also wanted to draw conclusions to be included in the training and capacity-building of people’s leaders in conducting Zero Evictions Campaigns in Africa and other regions of the world.

The research provides elements for analysis and reflection to be shared to help bring together the struggles of individual organizations, an essential spur to enhancing joint strategies, and to present the resistance movements’ proposals as credible alternatives, capable of mobilizing and having an impact.

Instead of the "efficient dictatorship" of practiced, no-limits developmentalism, resistance should therefore be considered as a valuable tool, provided by popular organizations for real "participatory slum upgrading".

By viewing it in this way, we could try to reconcile, through alternative and appropriate policies, the top-down approach and the bottom-up mechanism.

It is now up to popular organizations to study this research carefully, to carry out others analysis in their own territory to understand what is really happening, the weaknesses and the potential. We can thus work on the unity and impact of resistance struggles.

We can also make it clear to decision-makers that the resistance movements should be seen as offering added value and merit priority attention in all the slum-upgrading processes.

In other words, resistance should be recognized as an effective driving force promoting not only human rights and the environment but also the progress and responsibility of inhabitants as co-governors of the settlements in which they live and contribute to building.

The R-Existences: Resistance to destruction to affirm the right of people and communities to Exist.

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MULTIMEDIA COLLECTION TOWARDS THE URBAN WAY

This multimedia editorial collection created by the International Alliance of Habitants seeks to: offer tools, encourage debate, promote synergies between organisations and develop consensus; as well as demonstrate the existence of solutions to problems which are in favour of human rights and environmental conditions in line with inhabitants needs and the well being of our planet.

Through this collection we hope to give voice to those who have been silenced by gathering stories from men and women whose own experiences contain the very solutions needed to face habitat problems.

In this way we will foster the development of solid dialogue with public powers. We will contribute to the construction of the Urban and Community Way, a road and common space encouraging inhabitants organizations to share their experiences, exchange strategies and develop solidarity with global struggles to attack the root of problems, the neoliberal system, by creating alternative proposals and for the systematic change working from the bottom up.

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